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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Globalization has indeed made the world “flat,” and the sports 
industry is no exception.  Throughout the last two decades, American 
professional sports leagues have attempted with varying degrees of success 
to expand worldwide and create global product markets.  The impact of this 
internationalization is apparent—from the success of the World Baseball 
Classic in 2006 and 2009 to the exploding popularity that has led the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) to announce the creation of NBA 
China, a Chinese subsidiary league pairing Disney with other local 
partners.1  Perhaps the most significant of these effects is that the current 
player pool for most of the top American professional sports leagues is no 
longer purely domestic.  This sea change is well underway, with 
international players comprising significant portions of current professional 
sports rosters across the sporting spectrum.2  Partly as a result of domestic 
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 1. Michael J. de la Merced, Disney Among Firms to Buy Stake in NBA’s China 
Subsidiary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at C9. 
 2. There were seventy-seven international players from thirty-two countries and 
territories on NBA rosters as of January 2009.  NBA.com, NBA Players from Around the 
World: 2008-09 Season, http://www.nba.com/players/int_players_0809.html (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2009).  On Opening Day 2008, 239 Major League Baseball players (or twenty-
eight percent of all players) were international.  Larry Fine, International Players Comprise 
28 pct of MLB Rosters, REUTERS, Apr. 1, 2008, 
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market saturation, and partly as a result of the sports leagues attempting to 
expand to global markets, individual clubs are forced to look—and think—  
globally when seeking top-notch talent.  The importation of playing talent 
into these leagues facilitates their global marketability, as fan affinity in a 
foreign market is likely to be greater when there is a player from that 
market in the league.  The hope is that the establishment of global labor 
markets will help the leagues create global product markets. 
 Major League Baseball (“MLB”) has a unique approach to this global 
labor exchange.  This approach is evidenced by the system that was created 
to transfer players from the Japanese professional baseball league, Nippon 
Professional Baseball (“NPB”), to MLB teams following the departures of 
several high profile players in the mid-1990’s.  Over the last thirteen years, 
a system has evolved whereby the transfer of players from NPB to MLB is 
governed by a process that allows owners of NPB teams to receive 
compensation for their players who are still under contract but desire to 
leave for MLB before they are eligible for free agency in NPB.  When a 
player is under contract with a team in NPB and wishes to sign a contract 
with an MLB team, he must go through the “posting process.”  This 
process gives every MLB team the opportunity to bid to obtain the rights to 
negotiate a contract with him.  High-profile players such as Ichiro Suzuki 
and Daisuke Matsuzaka have joined MLB through this process, and as 
such, there has been considerable public attention directed towards it.3  
While significant media attention was focused on the staggering amount 
the Boston Red Sox paid for the right to negotiate with Matsuzaka— 
$51,111,111.114—there has been scant attention paid to the suboptimal 
 
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSSP8408520080402.  This was down 
slightly from the all-time high of 246 set in 2007. Jack Curry, Majors Set Record for 
International Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/sports/baseball/04curry.html.  During the 2007-08 
season, there were 273 non-North American players from fourteen different nations in the 
NHL.  This comprised over thirty-three percent of the players in the league. NHL 
International, NHL.com, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26372 (last visited Sept. 20, 
2009) [hereinafter NHL International]. 
 3. See Duane Rockerbie, Peculiarities of the Major League Baseball Posting System 
(July 2007) (on file with author) (discussing the increased attention paid to the posting 
system in recent years).  The agreement creating the posting process was in part borne out of 
the way in which Hideo Nomo, then a star pitcher with the Kintetsu Buffaloes, arrived in 
MLB.  Although still under contract with his NPB team, Nomo had a strong desire to pitch 
in MLB and sought to get out of his NPB contract.  Rather than wait the nine years required 
to become a free agent, Nomo “retired” from NPB and signed a contract with the Los 
Angeles Dodgers of MLB.  Id.  Bothered by this strategy, NPB and MLB agreed to the 
current posting system in hopes of deterring future Japanese stars from pursuing a similar 
path. Id. 
 4. Posting System, BR Bullpen, Baseball-Reference.com, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/bpv/index.php?title=Posting_system (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). 
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nature of the posting process for at least two of the three stakeholders.5 
 The issue of player transfers is pressing in the National Hockey 
League (“NHL”) as well, which means that two of the three North 
American-based professional sports leagues that draw significantly from a 
global player pool are having issues regarding their player transfer 
systems.6  There are several alternatives to the current process that can 
address the suboptimality of the status quo and provide for more efficient 
player transfers between leagues.  A more efficient posting process is 
important for historical reasons as well, with the Negro Leagues serving as 
an example of how an inadequate player transfer system can help lead to 
the demise of a league. 
II. THE POSTING PROCESS 
A. History 
A brief examination of the history of the posting process, and the 
events that led to its development, is essential for understanding why the 
process exists in its current form.  The movement of three players—Hideo 
Nomo, Hideki Irabu, and Alfonso Soriano—from NPB to MLB in the mid-
1990s persuaded the two leagues to complete a formal arrangement for the 
transfer of players.  However, the leagues’ shared history extends long 
before then.  The first Japanese player to appear in MLB was Masanori 
Murakami.7  His debut was the product of an exchange program between 
the Nankai Hawks and the San Francisco Giants, whereby Nankai sent 
three players to play in the Giants’ minor league system in 1964.8  
Murakami performed so well in the minor leagues that the Giants promoted 
him to the major leagues later that season, where his continued strong 
performance led the Giants to seek his return for the 1965 season.9  While 
Nankai originally balked at the prospect, the team ultimately capitulated on 
the condition that Murakami be permanently returned after the season.10  
 
 5. See discussion infra Part III (describing the suboptimalities of the current posting 
system). 
 6. The National Football League, on the other hand, has struggled to establish an 
international pipeline for player talent.  
 7. Evan Osborne, Baseball’s International Division of Labor, 7 J. OF SPORTS ECON. 
150 (2006). 
 8. Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 1: 
The Groundbreaker, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-Sports-
Examiner~y2008m12d2-A-brief-history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-1-
The-Groundbreaker. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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Despite a successful 1965 season, he was returned to the Japanese team.11  
This led to a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” between MLB and NPB in 1967, 
whereby MLB teams agreed that they would not sign NPB players unless 
they were free agents.12  Though a number of American players pursued 
careers in NPB (typically after their MLB careers were over), no Japanese 
player since Murakami moved to MLB until Hideo Nomo left the Kintetsu 
Buffaloes for the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1995.13 
 Nomo, a bona-fide star in Japan, used a loophole in his NPB contract 
in order to “retire” from his NPB team at the age of 26 so that he could 
avoid that league’s free agency restrictions.14  Nomo’s retirement allowed 
him to sign a three-year, $4.3 million contract with the Los Angeles 
Dodgers, a lucrative move that had a profound impact on both MLB and 
NPB franchise owners. 
 More significant than the Nomo retirement, at least in terms of 
providing the impetus for an agreement for the transfer of players from 
NPB to MLB, was the movement of star pitcher Hideki Irabu from the 
Chiba Lotte Marines to the New York Yankees in 1997.15  Prior to the 
existence of the formal posting process, the relationships between NPB 
teams and MLB teams were formed on an ad hoc basis, with the parties 
sometimes developing “working agreements” between individual clubs.16  
At the time, Irabu’s Japanese team, the Marines, had developed a working 
agreement with the San Diego Padres of MLB.  The working agreement 
allowed the Padres to buy the exclusive right to negotiate a contract with 
Irabu, which the Padres did.17  However, Irabu was unaware of his sale 
until it was completed without his permission.  He then declared his 
intention to play only for the New York Yankees, maintaining this stance 
until a trade was worked out between the Padres and Yankees before the 
1997 season.18  Again, the transfer of the Japanese player, and the way in 
which it transpired, raised sufficient concern on both sides of the Pacific to 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 2: 
The Tornado, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-Sports-
Examiner~y2008m12d3-A-brief-history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-2-
The-Tornado. 
 14. Casey Duncan, Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball’s United States-Japanese 
Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another “Baseball War”?, 13 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 87, 98 (2003). 
 15. See William B. Gould IV, Globalization in Collective Bargaining, Baseball, and 
Matsuzaka:  Labor and Antitrust Law on the Diamond, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 283, 
289 (2007) (discussing the developments that led to the formation of the current posting 
system). 
 16. Duncan, supra note 14, at 98. 
 17. Gould, supra note 15, at 289. 
 18. Street, supra note 13. 
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move the two leagues closer to a formal arrangement. 
Alfonso Soriano was the final player transferred prior to the adoption 
of the posting system.  In 1998, following the inability of Soriano to reach 
agreement on a contract with his NPB club, Hiroshima Toyo Carp, he 
attempted to retire, much in the same way Nomo had done three years 
earlier.19  But NPB had closed the loophole that Nomo previously 
exploited, and believed that it had exclusive rights to Soriano.20  Over the 
protests, threats and objections of NPB, Soriano signed a contract with the 
New York Yankees after a declaration by the MLB Commissioner’s Office 
that Soriano was, in fact, a free agent capable of signing with any team he 
desired.21  For NPB, this was a clear-cut sign that a formal agreement 
between NPB and MLB was the only way to stem the tide of player 
defections to MLB. 
B. Description of the Posting System 
There are three primary actors in the posting process who have a 
direct stake in the resulting outcome—the NPB team that transfers the 
player, the MLB team to which the player is transferred, and the player 
himself.  (There is potentially a fourth actor, the player’s agent, but because 
the agent’s interests are aligned with the player’s in the posting scenario, 
we consider just the player here.)22  Japanese players do not become 
international free agents until after they have played nine years in NPB;23 
 
 19. Duncan, supra note 14, at 89, 100. 
 20. Id. at 100.  Soriano only played the 1997 season for Hiroshima. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The agent should want to do away with the posting fee because it results in the 
player’s salary decreasing, which in turn decreases the agent’s fee (as baseball agents 
typically work on a percentage basis). 
 23. There are two categories of free agency in Japanese baseball – international and 
domestic.  Prior to 2008, players could achieve domestic free agency after eight years, and 
were allowed to move only to other NPB teams; international free agency could be attained 
after nine years, at which point players could sign with MLB teams with no compensation 
owed to their former NPB team. See 2009 NPB Free Agents, NPB Tracker, 
http://www.npbtracker.com/2009-npb-free-agents/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2009) (describing 
the NPB free agency system).  There was fairly little player movement under the previous 
domestic free agency system from the time that it was introduced in 1993 through 2008.  
Only thirty-two of the 251 players who became free agents from 2000 to 2003 switched 
teams.  Andrew Zimbalist, An Exchange of Strategies Could Benefit MLB, Japanese 
Leagues Alike, SPORTS BUS. J., July 16, 2007, at 29, available at 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/55693.  This was likely due to a compensation 
structure in which a team signing a free agent was required to pay the player’s former team 
1.2 times the player’s previous salary (or eighty percent of his previous year’s salary and a 
player from the new team’s roster).  This led to few transfers that did not involve high 
quality, modestly priced players.  Id.  While the international free agency rules remain 
unchanged, there was a major change in the domestic free agency rules in 2008.  First, the 
service time required for a player to become a free agent was decreased.  Players who 
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after their ninth year, they are free to sign a contract with any club, 
including those in MLB, without any transfer fee paid to the former NPB 
club.  Conversely, any Japanese player who has not yet played for nine 
years in NPB may not sign with an MLB team, having not yet attained 
international free agent status under NPB rules.24 
However, a player with less than nine years of experience who wishes 
to sign with an MLB team may ask his Japanese team to “post” him.  If the 
NPB team agrees to post the player, it notifies the office of the NPB 
Commissioner, which then notifies the MLB Commissioner, at which point 
all 30 MLB teams are notified that the player is available.25 
Once individual MLB teams have been notified, a four-day period 
begins during which MLB teams may compete in a sealed-bid auction for 
the exclusive right to negotiate a contract with the posted player.26  At the 
end of the four-day period, all bids are collected by the MLB 
Commissioner’s office and opened.  The NPB team is then notified of the 
amount of the highest bid (but not the identity of the MLB team) and has a 
four-day period to decide whether or not the winning bid will be accepted.27  
As of yet, in each situation where a winning bid has been submitted, it has 
been accepted by the NPB team.  The amount of the bid is considered the 
“transfer fee” associated with the movement of the player.  Following the 
acceptance of the highest bid by the NPB club, the MLB team that won the 
auction then has thirty days to negotiate a contract with the player.  Should 
 
entered NPB during or after the 2007 draft could become free agents after seven years.  
2009 NPB Free Agents, supra.  More importantly, the amount of compensation owed by the 
teams signing free agent players was decreased greatly. Under the new rule, players are 
classified into three groups according to their salaries on their prior teams.  Interview with 
Anonymous MLB Executive (July 17, 2008) (notes on file with Professor Rosner).  
Compensation owed by a team signing one of another team's three highest paid players 
(called ‘A players’) is eighty percent of the player’s previous year’s salary (or fifty percent 
and a player), while the compensation owed by the signing team for players whose salaries 
rank from the fourth highest to the tenth highest on their former team (‘B players’) is 60 
percent of their previous year’s salary (or forty percent and a player), and players whose 
salary ranks eleventh or below on their former team (‘C players’) can be signed without any 
compensation.  Id.  If the option of taking a lesser amount of monetary compensation and a 
player is chosen by the free agent’s former team, the player selected as compensation is 
chosen by the free agent’s former team from among the players on his new team.  Id.  This 
excludes non-Japanese players and twenty-eighty players that the signing team chooses to 
protect.  Id.  This could subject the signing team to losing a young prospect and could 
represent a significant cost.  Any compensation owed by a team signing a free agent 
disincentivizes a team from doing so to some degree.  A club desiring a particular free agent 
must then decide whether that player is worth the cost. 
 24. Paul White, Japan Frets Over Talent Exodus to North America, USA TODAY, Mar. 
28, 2007, at 1C. 
 25. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 26. Allan T. Ingraham, A Fair Posting Process for Japanese Professionals Entering 
Major League Baseball, 24 ENT. AND SPORTS LAW. 1, 1 (2007). 
 27. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
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the contract negotiation yield a signed deal, the transfer fee is then paid to 
the NPB team by the MLB team, and the player becomes a member of the 
MLB team.28  If the player and the MLB team do not come to an 
agreement, however, the NPB team does not receive the transfer fee and 
the player returns to the NPB team under the terms of his original contract 
with the club.29  The posting system is unilateral in nature, as it does not 
apply to MLB players seeking employment in Japan.30 
The following chart31 is a complete representation of every player who 
has been successfully posted, along with the MLB team that “won” the 
auction and the price that team paid for the rights to negotiate with the 
player: 
DATE PLAYER MLB TEAM TRANSFER FEE 
($US) 
2/1999 Alejandro 
Quezada 
Cincinnati 
Reds 
$400,001 
11/2000 Ichiro 
Suzuki 
Seattle 
Mariners 
$13,125,000 
1/2003 Kazuhisa 
Ishii 
Los Angeles 
Dodgers 
$11,260,000 
2/2003 Ramon 
Ramirez 
San Diego 
Padres 
$300,050 
11/2003 Akinori 
Otsuka 
San Diego 
Padres 
$300,000 
1/2005 Norihiro 
Nakamura 
Los Angeles 
Dodgers 
Unknown32 
12/2005 Shinji Mori Tampa Bay 
Devil Rays 
$1,000,000 
11/2006 Daisuke 
Matsuzaka 
Boston Red 
Sox 
$51,111,111.11 
11/2006 Akinori 
Iwamura 
Tampa Bay 
Devil Rays 
$4,500,000 
11/2006 Kei Igawa New York 
Yankees 
$26,000,194 
 
 
 28. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 15. 
 29. United States – Japanese Player Contract Agreement, 
http://jpbpa.net/convention/2001_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
 30. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 31. This chart is reproduced from Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 32. While the actual amount of the posting fee is unknown, it is believed to have been 
for a nominal amount. Tony Jackson, Costly Risk Nakamura Leaves Money, Stardom to Join 
Dodgers, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 2005.  
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The example of Matsuzaka, a star pitcher for the Seibu Lions, is 
illustrative of the posting process.  He had established himself as a premier 
Japanese professional baseball pitcher.33  The Boston Red Sox outbid both 
the New York Mets (who bid a reported $39 million) and the New York 
Yankees (who bid $33 million), determining that the right to negotiate with 
Matsuzaka was worth an unprecedented $51.1 million.34  Following the 
announcement of its winning bid, the Red Sox then had thirty days to 
negotiate a contract with Matsuzaka, with the Seibu Lions receiving the 
$51.1M upon the signing of the contract.  Ultimately, the Red Sox and 
Matsuzaka agreed to a six-year, $52 million contract, putting the total 
expenditures by the Red Sox at $103.1 million for one player.35 
III.   THE SUBOPTIMALITIES OF THE POSTING PROCESS 
There are several reasons why the posting process is suboptimal, 
including:  1) it creates windfall profits for the NPB transfer team; 2) the 
first-price-sealed-bid auction inflates winning bids by MLB teams; 3) 
individual players are unable to realize their full market value in contract 
negotiations; 4) individual players have no ability to choose the MLB 
teams for which they play; 5) the system could adversely affect the 
competitive balance of MLB teams; and 6) the loss of marquee players 
negatively impacts NPB as a league.  This section is divided into five sub-
sections that each address the posting process and its impact on the actors 
involved.  These sections also explore whether recent developments will 
alter the relationship between MLB and NPB. 
A.   Windfall Profits for the NPB Clubs 
The Seibu Lions, as the transferee team and recipient of the $51.1 
million posting fee, is the beneficiary of a system that creates optimal 
outputs from its perspective.  Although the loss of star players certainly 
impacts the team’s prospects for competitive success and its long-term 
profitability, the transfer fee received by NPB teams is money that the team 
would otherwise not have received if the player had left as a free agent or 
had signed with MLB before being drafted by or playing in an NPB 
organization.  Thus, the transfer fee represents a windfall profit for the 
 
 33. Barry M. Bloom, Red Sox win Matsuzaka bid, MLB.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061113&content_id=1739983&vkey=hotstove
2006&fext=.jsp. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Gordon Edes, Matsuzaka, Red Sox Agree to Terms, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/2006/12/14/matsuzaka_red_sox_agre
e_to_terms/. 
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NPB team.  In exchange for two years without Matsuzaka (who would have 
been a free agent after the 2008 season), the Lions received approximately 
three times the entire team’s 2006 payroll, just for owning the rights to the 
star pitcher.36  From a financial perspective, the posting system is tilted 
heavily in favor of the current Japanese team, as Seibu received an amount 
for the rights to the player that was far in excess of the value of the player’s 
marginal revenue product that Seibu would have received had he played for 
them in 2007 and 2008.37 
Another factor contributing to the NPB windfall is that the bidding by 
MLB teams is conducted as a first-price-sealed-bid auction, where the 
bidding parties do not know the amount that the others are bidding.38  
Because of the zero-sum nature of this transfer (NPB’s financial gain is 
MLB’s loss), a more efficient outcome could be achieved if the MLB teams 
engaged in an ascending-price auction, where teams are apprised of the 
value that the other teams attach to the individual player.39  In the 
Matsuzaka bidding, the most efficient bid by the Red Sox would have been 
just $1 more than the New York Mets (the next highest bidder), a bid that 
would have been in the $39 million range.40  Because the bidding was 
sealed, however, the Red Sox outbid the Mets by more than $12 million, an 
inefficiency directly captured by the Seibu Lions. 
While the current posting process is favored by NPB teams that 
capture the inefficiencies of the first-price-sealed-bid auction, the system is 
suboptimal for the MLB team paying the transfer fee.  Each individual 
MLB team that bids must make a determination, based upon little market 
evidence, regarding the optimal price to be paid for the rights to negotiate 
with the player.  While the MLB team wants to win the auction, it wants to 
bid just $1 more than the next highest bidder.  But in the absence of any 
reliable information about the presence, identity, and number of other 
actors in the market, it is extremely difficult to make this precise 
determination.  The result, then, is the possibility that MLB teams who are 
committed to winning the auction (e.g., the Red Sox) will pay far more for 
a player than they otherwise would have if the auction were not private. 
B.  The Player’s Loss of Market Value and Freedom of Choice 
The third actor in the process, the individual player, also succumbs to 
suboptimal outputs because he is unable to capture his full market value 
 
 36. Jeff Sackman, Putting a Price on Matsuzaka, THE HARDBALL TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006, 
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/putting-a-price-on-matsuzaka/. 
 37. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 17. 
 38. Id. at 1. 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. Bloom, supra note 33. 
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when signing a contract with the MLB team and cannot choose the MLB 
club for which he will play.  Players (and, consequentially, their agents) are 
victimized by systemic limitations of the posting process that prevent the 
player from signing a contract that is truly indicative of his full market 
value.  When computing a value and a price ceiling for an individual 
player, MLB teams usually consider all of the outlays associated with 
signing that player to a contract.  In the case of acquiring a player from 
NPB, the MLB team computes the value of the player (the price the team is 
willing to pay), by adding the transfer fee to the value of the contract.41  In 
Matsuzaka’s case, the Red Sox attributed a value to the player of $103.1 
million—$51.1 million in the transfer fee and another $52 million for the 
contract itself.  Thus, the value attached to Matsuzaka by the Red Sox was 
nearly double what Matsuzaka actually received in compensation.  It is 
highly likely that the player would have received a higher salary from the 
club but for the posting fee that was paid to acquire his rights.  One 
commentator estimates that Seibu received 76.7 percent of Matsuzaka’s net 
present value through posting him, whereas he received only 23.3 percent 
of his own net present value.42  Thus, the NPB team is grossly 
 
 41. The club must also add to the equation any new or additional luxury tax payment 
that may have to be paid on the value of the contract that the player signs with the club, 
though not on the amount of the posting fee paid to acquire the rights to the player.  Maury 
Brown, Breaking Down MLB’s Luxury Tax: 2003-2007, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, Dec. 25, 
2007, 
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1805&Itemi
d=41.  Including the salary paid to Matsuzaka in 2007, the Red Sox had a team payroll of 
$155,402,595, and thus had to make a luxury tax payment to Major League Baseball of 
$6,064,287. Id.  The Red Sox paid a tax rate of 40% on this amount, which represents the 
club’s payroll for its forty-man roster, including player salaries and prorated shares of all 
signing and incentive bonuses, option buyouts, non-cash compensation, and cash 
transactions.  Id.  Thus, in addition to Matsuzaka’s salary, the Red Sox paid an additional 
luxury tax of approximately $2,533,333 due to his 2007 salary of $6 million and the 
$333,333.33 signing bonus allocation (representing a prorated share of his $2 million 
signing bonus over the six-year life of the contract).  Cot’s Baseball Contracts, Boston Red 
Sox, http://mlbcontracts.blogspot.com/2004/12/boston-red-sox.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2009).  When considering the actual signing bonus payment of $2 million, playing salary 
and luxury tax, the club’s total expenditure on the player in 2007 was $10,533,333.  Id.  This 
sum does not include the value of various perquisites afforded to Matsuzaka, including:  the 
services of a physical therapist, massage therapist, interpreter and a team employee to assist 
with the Japanese media, eight first-class, round-trip airline tickets per year between Boston 
and Japan, an annual spring training housing allowance of up to $25,000, an annual Boston 
housing allowance of up to $75,000, a one-time moving allowance of up to $35,000, the use 
of a Lincoln Town Car or similar car, and a Red Sox player ticket package, including two 
field box seats.  Id. 
 42. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 17.  Matsuzaka’s contract with the Red Sox was worth 
approximately $15.6 million to the player in current dollars, where Seibu received the full 
amount of the $51.1 million transfer fee since it was paid up front.  Id.  If he had remained 
with Seibu, Matsuzaka would have been paid $4 million in both 2007 and 2008.  Id.  As a 
nine-year veteran, he would have been eligible to come to MLB after the 2008 season as a 
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overcompensated and the player dramatically undercompensated. 
If Matsuzaka had been a traditional MLB free agent and the Red Sox 
felt that he was valued at $103.1 million, then the Red Sox would have 
been willing to sign him to a contract where he received that full $103.1 
million.  When initially discussing contract terms with the Red Sox after 
the team won the auction, Matsuzaka and his agent, Scott Boras, felt that 
the transfer fee should not be included in determining the value of 
Matsuzaka to the Red Sox.43  Not surprisingly, the Red Sox included the 
posting fee in all calculations of Matsuzaka’s value, based on the theory 
that regardless of where the money was going, the team had to pay $103.1 
million to get him in a Red Sox uniform.  It has been predicted that, if a 
simple bargaining model were used, Seibu would have received only 54.3 
percent of Matsuzaka’s value and the player would have received the rest.44  
In other words, had the transfer fee been the product of a negotiation 
between Matsuzaka and Seibu, it is theorized that the maximum transfer 
fee would have been $30.4 million, which is $20.7 million less than the 
posting fee paid.45  Theoretically, then, the posting system also constitutes a 
loss for all MLB players (and thus the MLBPA), as the amount of the 
posting fee represents MLB club monies spent on player compensation that 
does not actually accrue to the players. 
While the player does have the ability to walk away from negotiations 
and not sign a contract with the MLB team, this threat has yet to 
materialize in any of the ten instances where a player has been posted to a 
MLB team.46  For the players, then, there is very little they can do to 
leverage a fair market deal out of the MLB team.  A player must settle for a 
contract that is not indicative of his actual market value if he chooses to 
play in MLB; otherwise, he can refuse to sign the contract and return to 
Japan.  In addition, it is unlikely that his Japanese club would want him to 
return; the club previously decided that it would rather collect the posting 
fee than retain the player’s services.  The Seibu Lions received $51.1 
million in exchange for Matsuzaka, instead of losing him without receiving 
any compensation had he left the team via free agency upon expiration of 
his contract after the 2008 season.47 
 
free agent.  Id.  The net present value of his contract, had he stayed with Seibu in 2007 and 
2008 and then come to MLB as an unrestricted free agent, would have been $15,518,029, 
which is just less than the estimated net present value of Matsuzaka’s current $15,552,723 
contract with the Red Sox.  Id.  Thus, Matsuzaka earned barely more as a result of coming 
to MLB via the posting system than he would have by staying in Japan for two years and 
then coming over as a traditional nine year free agent. 
 43. Edes, supra note 35. 
 44. Ingraham, supra note 26, at 18. 
 45. Id. at 17. 
 46. Posting System, supra note 4. 
 47. Sackman, supra note 36. 
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An additional concern for the player is his inability to choose which 
MLB club he will play for if he enters MLB via the posting process.  The 
player has no choice but to play for the team that wins the auction for his 
services.48  Particularly with respect to the transfer of native Japanese 
players, there is additional leverage held by the MLB team—the Japanese 
player’s desire to save face by not turning down the American team.  From 
a cultural perspective, the loss of face that would be suffered by the player 
who could not come to a negotiated agreement would be overwhelming, 
and thus the prospect of this occurring is fairly low.  Following the signing 
of Matsuzaka for a below-market contract (not factoring in the posting fee), 
many commentaries focused on the fact that Matsuzaka, because of the 
cultural desire to preserve his image, would never have refused the Red 
Sox offer and returned to Japan.49  That was not an option, especially for a 
player as highly regarded in Japan as Matsuzaka. 
The posting system also creates opportunities for moral hazard.  There 
exists the potential for under-the-table dealing between the NPB team and 
the player in order to facilitate a contractual agreement between the player 
and the MLB team.  The NPB team could conceivably posit to the player, 
“We’ll offer you $X million if you sign with the MLB team,” where X 
represents the gap between the MLB club’s offer and the player’s desired 
salary.  The NPB team does not want the negotiation to fail because it 
would then lose the posting fee.  In addition, the posting system allows for 
the possibility of foreclosure, or preemptive bidding because one team may 
potentially bid far higher than the player’s value merely to obtain exclusive 
negotiating rights with the player.  The bidding team would not want to 
sign the player to a contract, but does so as a defensive tactic to prevent a 
rival from obtaining the player’s services for the upcoming season, since a 
player can be posted only once in each offseason.50  Wide adoption of this 
strategy could prevent the system from functioning effectively, as the only 
players who will be successfully posted are those perceived to be of 
marginal ability.51 
 
 48. This current system — that the NPB player can play only for the team that wins his 
rights through the posting process — is largely a result of the aforementioned transfer of 
Hideki Irabu from the Chiba Lotte Marines to the San Diego Padres, who subsequently 
traded his rights to the New York Yankees following a demand by Irabu.  Following the 
Irabu transfer, NPB and MLB teams recognized the danger in permitting individual players 
to demand to which team they are transferred, and agreed to establish the current posting 
process. Street, supra note 8. 
 49. Jack Curry, After Forcing Issue, Red Sox On Verge of Matsuzaka Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2006, at D1. 
 50. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 51. Id. at 9. 
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C.   The Impact on MLB Competitive Balance 
An equally large concern, particularly for MLB, is that the posting 
process could adversely affect the competitive balance within the league.  
If large-revenue MLB teams are the only teams with the financial means to 
successfully bid on Japanese players, especially when the posting fees for 
certain players reach into the $50 million territory, only certain teams will 
have access to this market of players.  Of the ten players who have been 
successfully posted and transferred to MLB teams, only five have been 
transferred to large-revenue teams.52  However, larger revenue clubs have 
paid the four largest fees, suggesting that they have increased access to the 
most desirable talent.53  While the empirical evidence seems to suggest that 
this issue has not yet reached the level of being a problem requiring 
immediate attention, the manner in which the Matsuzaka auction was won 
raises concern for some.54  If only the largest revenue teams have access to 
NPB stars in the posting process, then there is at least the possibility that an 
unbalanced distribution of talent in MLB could result.  This is particularly 
concerning because the posting fee paid by the MLB team does not count 
against the team’s luxury tax number, and thus, is not subject to a luxury 
tax penalty.55  Had the Red Sox signed a free agent pitcher from another 
team within MLB for the $103.1 million they paid for Matsuzaka, all 
$103.1 million of that contract would have been subject to the 40% luxury 
tax aimed at leveling the playing field in MLB.  However, because $51.1 
million of the money paid for Matsuzaka was allocated as a transfer fee 
(and not subject to the luxury tax), the Red Sox luxury tax figure for the 
Matsuzaka signing was only $52 million.  This legal loophole circumvents 
precisely the problem that the luxury tax was aimed at fixing, and furthers 
the problem of competitive balance in MLB.  Given that signing a player 
from NPB has less of a luxury tax impact than signing a similar MLB free 
agent, there is a credible risk that only large-market MLB teams will have 
access to the posting process.56 
D.   The Impact on Japanese Baseball 
While the NPB team that successfully posts a player receives short-
term windfall profits by doing so, the loss of marquee players has a 
 
 52. Posting System, supra note 4. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Sean McAdam, Boston Doesn’t Have Any Payroll Limitations, ESPN.COM, 
Nov. 15, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?id=2662770 (explaining teams 
in smaller markets have a hard time competing for high priced talent). 
 55. Gould, supra note 15, at 293. 
 56. Jim Allen, Ishii Flies the Nest, JIM ALLEN’S JAPANESE BASEBALL PAGE, Jan. 10, 
2002, http://www2.gol.com/ users/jallen/column/20020110.html. 
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deleterious effect on the overall NPB league product and on the medium- 
and long-term business of the posting team itself.  The migration of Hideo 
Nomo to the Los Angeles Dodgers had a strong influence on both Japanese 
baseball and MLB.  Though Nomo was initially treated as a pariah when he 
left NPB for America,57 fans grew to accept his departure and followed en 
masse as the NHK public television network broadcast his games live 
throughout Japan.58  His success with the Dodgers increased Japanese 
interest in MLB and created opportunities for future Japanese players to 
play in the United States.59  Since Nomo’s 1995 debut, 36 Japanese players 
have played in MLB regular season games,60 including sixteen who were 
on MLB Opening Day rosters in 2008.61 
Legendary Japanese baseball player Sadaharu Oh stated:  “It’s been a 
great plus for baseball in Japan[.]  Thanks to Nomo, kids in high school and 
junior high now have dreams of playing in M.L.B.  Going to America and 
directly competing over there is a much better way to improve the level of 
play here than the good-will-type all-star exhibition series they used to hold 
when I was a player.  Japan’s still inferior to America in baseball, but as 
more players aim to play over there, the gap will continue to close.”62 
With respect to how Nomo created opportunities for Japanese players 
in the United States, Oh stated, “He showed that the level of Japanese 
baseball was not that different from the major leagues[.]”63 
Though Nomo’s successful MLB career positively impacted baseball 
in both Japan and the United States, Japanese baseball has suffered from 
the loss of a number of popular star players to MLB through both free 
agency and posting.  Despite three NPB teams generating over $80 million 
by posting Matsuzaka, Igawa, and Iwamura prior to the 2007 season, there 
was despair at the NPB offices over losing such popular players.64  There 
seems to be some recognition that the pursuit of the short-term revenues 
generated by posting could lead to a long-term decrease in revenues.  
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles manager Katsuya Nomura stated, “If this 
 
 57. Robert Whiting, Is the MLB Destroying Japan’s National Pastime?, JAPAN TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070411c1.html; Baseball Runs for 
a Fan Base in Japan (Marketplace radio broadcast Sept. 14, 2007), 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/09/14/baseball_nation/. 
 58. Claire Smith, Dodgers Look East, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/02.13.html. 
 59. For the Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 28, 2008, at 20. 
 60. Brad Lefton, Sadaharu Oh Still Feels and Thinks the Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 
2008, at B2. 
 61. For the Record, supra note 59. 
 62. Lefton, supra note 60. 
 63. For the Record, supra note 59. 
 64. Jack Curry, From Japan to Tampa, Iwamura Lives Up to the No. 1 on His Back, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at SP3.; Whiting, supra note 57. 
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keeps up, Japanese baseball is truly finished.”65 
Yomiuri Giants club representative Hidetoshi Kiyotake added, “Seibu 
might have made a nice profit in the short term, but in the long term, 
they’re strangling themselves.  This is a big loss for the baseball world.”66 
With NPB players leaving for the challenge of playing in MLB, as 
well as its increased salaries and better living and working conditions,67 
NPB is likely to lose even more of its players to MLB in the future.  The 
high fee paid for Matsuzaka and his potential for long-term MLB success is 
a portent for Japanese baseball.  Moreover, the fact that the MVP of the 
Japanese national team left with great fanfare for a successful MLB team 
that paid him nearly what the top MLB free agent pitchers in the market 
secured is likely to lead to more NPB players pursuing careers in MLB, 
which will only further the uncertainty surrounding the future of NPB.68  
This dynamic is heightened by the fact that there is no longer a stigma 
attached to players leaving NPB; fans are okay with it, as they can still 
watch their favorite Japanese players on television or the internet rather 
than in person despite their exit to MLB.69  In fact, most Japanese fans are 
proud of these transfers’ accomplishments and identify with them, rather 
than feeling resentment.70  It is simply not practical to expect that MLB 
teams will cease their pursuit of Japanese players, just as it was impractical 
to think that Japanese automakers would not pursue the U.S. market.71  To 
that end, MLB scouts have descended upon Japan in search of talent.72  
Japanese baseball officials are hopeful that a role model effect might be 
possible, with more of the best young Japanese athletes choosing to play 
baseball because of the success of the Japanese players in MLB.73 
While the NPB team receives a windfall profit when it successfully 
posts one of its players, this short-term cash infusion may be offset by the 
subsequent impact of the loss of the player on the team’s on-field 
performance, attendance, public relations, and television ratings74—all of 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  Regarding the fact that players are leaving Japan for the challenge of MLB, 
Matsuzaka said in an interview with the NHK Network, "It's only natural to want to test 
yourself in the best league in the world against the best players.  The scale of big league ball 
is something else."  Id.  Matsuzaka more than doubled his salary when he signed with the 
Red Sox.  Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Robert Whiting, NPB Players in Need of Strong Union Like MLBPA, JAPAN TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070414c1.html. 
 70. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 71. Whiting, supra note 69. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Evidence suggests that this began with Nomo’s departure for Los Angeles, as 
Japanese fans followed Nomo in MLB at the expense of watching NPB baseball, raising 
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which could have a deleterious effect on the team’s revenues in the 
medium- to long-term.  It is reasonable to expect that an NPB team would 
be negatively impacted in both winning percentage and attendance when a 
player is lost through the posting system because the team is losing a high-
caliber player who served as a gate attraction for fans.  The economic 
benefits that NPB clubs receive from transfer fees are not necessarily 
conducive to helping their future on-field success.  Japanese teams tend to 
be more focused on the short-term than on the long-term because of their 
corporate ownership.  As a result, the posting fees received by the teams 
are either filtered back to the parent corporation or are intended to provide 
the team with a needed infusion of capital to reduce what is usually a 
significant cash shortfall; typically, the posting fee is not intended to be 
used to sign another player in the hope of replacing the lost production of 
the defected player.  Unlike in MLB, where a team may seek to replace a 
star lost through free agency with another high-caliber player, the limited 
movement of impact free agents  in NPB makes it very difficult to replace a 
lost player even if the team and its parent corporation are so inclined. 
A closer look at the impact of losing a posted player on the on-field 
performance of his former NPB team yields mixed results.  It is difficult to 
estimate the impact of the loss of these players on each team’s win-loss 
record, as there are clearly a number of other factors that affected their 
performance.  Nonetheless, of the ten players who have been successfully 
posted, the former team had a worse record in the season immediately after 
the posting on six occasions and a better record on four occasions.75  The 
impact of losing players through the posting system on the attendance of 
their former NPB teams is also difficult to judge with accuracy because of 
the lack of reporting standards prior to the 2005 season.76  Before 2005, 
NPB teams simply estimated attendance, and these estimates were typically 
much higher than the actual number of fans who appeared to be in the 
stadium.77  It is also reasonable to expect that the team would suffer in its 
 
concerns that other players would follow him and lead to decreased attendance and 
television ratings in NPB. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 75. The six clubs that fared worse in the season following the posting were Hanshin 
(.063 worse in 2007), Yakult (.073 worse in 2007), Seibu (.127 worse in the 2007 season 
following the loss of Matsuzaka), Orix (.079 worse in 2006), Yakult (.023 worse in 2002), 
and Hiroshima (.022 worse in 1999).  The four teams that fared better in the season 
following the posting were Seibu (.104 better in 2006), Chunichi (.058 better in 2004), 
Hiroshima (.015 better in 2003), and Orix (.026 better in the 2001 season following the loss 
of Ichiro).  NPB Tracker, The Effects of NPB Players Leaving for MLB, part 4, Jan 3, 2009, 
http://www.npbtracker.com/2009/01/the-effects-of-npb-players-leaving-for-mlb-part-4/. 
 76. Paul White, Unclear How Fans’ Interest Is Affected, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2007, at 
2C. 
 77. Average attendance for Seibu was 16,223 in 2005, increased to 17,597 in 2006 and 
decreased to 15,187 in 2007. Pacific League, 
http://pacific.npb.or.jp/bluebook/blu_spect1.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009).  Hanshin’s 
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public relations as a result of transferring a star performer.  Much as 
American sports fans protest the loss of a favorite player to another team 
via free agency by voicing their anger at the team, a Japanese team that 
posts a player risks incurring the wrath of its fan base.  If, as a result, fans 
stay away from the ballpark and do not watch television broadcasts, then 
the team’s revenues will suffer.  While fans tend to be forgiving over the 
occasional loss of a player, a team that regularly posts players will not be as 
fortunate. 
Finally, the television ratings for NPB games have fallen significantly 
as an increasing number of the league’s better players have moved to 
MLB.78  Meanwhile, MLB games are broadcast daily in Japan and receive 
 
average attendance was 43,218 in 2006 and 43,669 in 2007.  Id.  Average attendance for 
Yakult Swallows was 18,019 in 2006 and increased to 18,517 in 2007.  Central League, 
http://www.npb.or.jp/cl/entertaiment/report/index3.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).  Orix 
Buffaloes attendance increased from 19,943 in 2005 to 20,445 in 2006.  Id. 
 78. Tom Van Riper, Major League Baseball Goes Global, FORBES, Dec. 20, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/2005/12/20/baseball-gm-disney-cx_tvr_1220baseball.html.  
Television ratings for games for the Yomiuri Giants, historically the most popular team in 
Japan, decreased from 21.4 percent in 1996 to 9.7 percent in 2008, according to Video 
Research, a Tokyo-based TV ratings company. 
http://www.videor.co.jp/data/ratedata/program/07giants.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
Unlike in the United States, the terrestrial broadcasting stations still have a significant share 
of the market in Japan, and the only team that had its games consistently broadcasted on 
terrestrial stations was the Yomiuri Giants.  Letter from Kohei Nakagawa, Attorney, TMI 
Associates, to Scott Rosner (Feb. 26, 2009) (on file with author).  The games for other teams 
are broadcast on satellite and cable television but, unfortunately, the ratings for these media 
are not made public.  Id.  However, the ratings for the terrestrial games are made public.  Id.  
The sharp drop in ratings can be attributed in part to Yomiuri's ‘Yankees-like’ strategy of 
bringing star players from other NPB teams through domestic free agency, which upset its 
fan base.  However, the loss of Giants and other star NPB players to MLB through both 
posting and free agency in 2000 and 2001 likely had an even more significant impact on the 
ratings.  Kazu Sasaki was the best closer in Japan, and he pitched especially well against 
Yomiuri, which became a must-see matchup.  Id.  Ichiro was undoubtedly the most talented 
hitter and Shinjo was a star player for Hanshin Tigers.  Id.  After they left for MLB, many 
baseball fans began to feel that perhaps Yomiuri's games were not worth watching any 
more.  Id.  However, the biggest cause of the Giants’ decrease in television ratings was the 
loss of Hideki Matsui; it was the first time that one of its star players decided to play in 
MLB. Id.  The drop in the ratings led the television stations to reduce the number of 
Yomiuri games they broadcasted nationally. Id.  In 2008, only half of the Giants games were 
broadcast on the terrestrial broadcasting channels.  Id.  Demand fell along with the reduced 
supply, with average ratings dropping below 10 percent.  Id.  When a rating for a prime time 
(7:00 pm - 9:00 pm) program is below 10 percent in Japan, it is regarded as not a popular 
program.  Id.  The ratings of the popular programs on the prime time are usually around 16 - 
20%.  Id.  The low ratings resulted in lower prices being paid for Yomiuri’s broadcasting 
rights.  Id.  Although the actual price is not made public, it is believed that the price is now 
about half what it was in the past.  Id.  Other teams’ games are mainly broadcasted on local 
stations or cable channels and the ratings were low from the start.  Id.  Therefore, although 
the official data is not available, it seems to be that the loss of their star players is not 
hurting their television ratings as much.  Id.  In fact, due to efforts to operate more wisely by 
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detailed coverage in Japanese newspapers, with many Japanese fans 
following MLB closely.79  More people in Japan watched Matsuzaka pitch 
his Red Sox games in 2007—all of which were broadcast on NHK-BS 
satellite, which is available in 13 million Japanese homes—than watched 
his televised Seibu Lions games in 2006 (which had an estimated 
viewership of 100,000 fans).80  MLB has successfully monetized this 
increased interest, resulting in nearly seventy percent of MLB’s 
international revenue coming from Japan.81  MLB currently receives close 
to $100 million annually from the Japanese marketplace—slightly less than 
$50 million from Dentsu (a Japanese advertising agency) and NHK in 
television rights fees, and approximately $50 million additionally from 
licensing, sponsorships, and advertising.82 
While some believe that a continual draining of the talent pool in NPB 
will ultimately lead to the demise of NPB,83 it is far more likely that, with 
the appropriate reforms to its currently flawed operating structure, NPB 
will endure.  There remains strong fan interest in and passion for the 
league, it has a long history, it still produces numerous high-quality 
players, and it may be the only country in the world where baseball is still 
the national sport.84  To retain their viability, however, NPB and its teams 
need to alter their priorities and organization, as currently their structures 
are suboptimal for both business and player development. 
NPB teams are operated in a manner that is quite different from their 
MLB counterparts.  Rather than operating as stand-alone companies, as do 
the vast majority of teams in MLB, Japanese baseball teams are part of 
larger corporations that use the team to market and sell their products.85  
For example, the Hokkaido Nippon Ham Fighters are owned by the Nippon 
Ham meat processing company and exist primarily for the purpose of 
selling its products.86  The underlying rationale for using the baseball teams 
 
focusing their attention on their local markets, some teams (especially those in the Pacific 
League) are thought to be getting higher local television ratings.  Id.  However, the price of 
their broadcasting rights seems to have not gone up yet.  Id.  The price for the broadcasting 
rights of these teams are still traded at much lower prices than those of Yomiuri's games.  Id. 
 79. ROBERT K. FITTS & DANIEL K. INOUYE, WALLY YONAMINE: THE MAN WHO 
CHANGED JAPANESE BASEBALL 316-17 (2008). 
 80. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 81. Baseball Runs for a Fan Base in Japan, supra note 57. 
 82. See Zimbalist, supra note 23. 
 83. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 84. Whiting, supra note 69. 
 85. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 86. Id.  The other teams in NPB and its owners are the Yomiuri Giants (Yomiuri media 
conglomerate); Hiroshima Toyo Carp (Toyo car components Company); Yokohama Bay 
Stars (Tokyo Broadcasting System); Tokyo Yakult Swallows (Yakult Corporation, a yogurt 
maker); Hanshin Tigers (Hanshin Electric Railway Company); Chunichi Dragons (Chunichi 
media group); Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks (SoftBank internet services company); Saitama 
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in this fashion is that Japanese companies believe it is cheaper to purchase 
and run the team and get in the media every day through the coverage of 
the games than it is to advertise on Japanese prime-time television.87  This 
belief is reflected in the selection and deployment of their managerial 
talent.  Unlike their American counterparts, Japanese baseball club 
executives typically are not baseball experts; instead, they are employees 
who rotate through the team from the parent company’s headquarters.88   
The league’s fragmented structure is reflected in its flat growth over the 
past two decades, with attendance hovering around 20 million per year and 
total league revenues at approximately $1 billion.89  Historically, two NPB 
teams have done well on and off the field; the Yomiuri Giants and Hanshin 
Tigers both draw 3 million fans annually and are estimated to generate ¥20 
billion annually, primarily through gate receipts and television rights fees.90  
The teams hand their profits over to their parent companies.91  Most other 
teams suffer operating losses even when successful on the field.92  For 
 
Seibu Lions (Seibu railway company); Chiba Lotte Marines (Lotte foods conglomerate); 
Orix Buffaloes (Orix, a financial services company based in Tokyo); and Tohoku Rakuten 
Golden Eagles (Rakuten online shopping mall).  See Bay Stars Get New Owners, JAPAN 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20020202a1.html (discussing 
ownership of the Yokohama Bay Stars); Kate Berry, Houlihan Officers Sell Shares as Part 
of Orix Takeover, L.A. BUS. J., Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Houlihan+officers+sell+shares+as+part+of+Orix+takeover.-
a0139170905 (discussing ownership of the Orix Buffaloes); Carp Owner Dies, JAPAN 
TIMES, July 12, 2002, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20020712a2.html (discussing 
ownership of the Hiroshima Toyo Carp); Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Get Green Light, JAPAN 
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2004, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20041225a2.html (discussing 
SoftBank ownership of the Hawks); Mondo Times, Chunichi Shimbun, 
http://www.mondotimes.com/1/world/jp/200/4631/11683 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) 
(discussing ownership of the Chunichi Dragons); Michiyo Nakamoto, Baseball Fans Upset 
by Shifts in Ownership, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/07/business/ft-baseball7 (discussing corporate 
ownership of the Hanshin Tigers, Saitama Seibu Lions, Orix Buffaloes, Yomiuri Giants, and 
the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles); Eric Neel, Gaijin No Longer Means “Outsider,” 
ESPN.COM, Feb. 28, 2007, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/asia/columns/story?columnist=neel_eric&id=2766707 
(discussing ownership of the Tokyo Yakult Swallows); Jeff Passan, Happy Valentine, 
YAHOO SPORTS, Mar. 21, 2008, http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-
valentine032008&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (discussing ownership of the Chiba Lotte 
Marines); Michael Westbay, 2009 Japanese Baseball Teams, PRO YAKYU NOW, 
http://japanesebaseball.com/teams/index.gsp (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) (providing a list of 
teams for the 2009 season). 
 87. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 88. Id.  American sports fans would find it surprising to note that, in 2007, the Orix 
Buffaloes newly appointed general manager told reporters that he only had heard of one 
player on the entire team.  Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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example, when the Nippon Ham Fighters won the title in 2006, “[they] 
drew 1,635,410 fans. . . . [and they] still needed a multimillion dollar 
bailout from [their] parent company.”93  The Chiba Lotte Marines were 
estimated to have lost over ¥2 billion in 2005 when they won the title, and 
the Chunichi Dragons won the Central League pennant in both 2005 and 
2006, but were estimated to have lost more than ¥10 billion during that 
period.94  The decentralized league structure—where there is little 
cooperation among the teams, no league-wide media, marketing or 
licensing contracts, and no revenue sharing—results in stark contrasts 
between revenues generated by individual teams.95  The revenue disparity 
is evidenced by television rights deals:  Yomiuri sold its 2006 television 
rights fees for ¥100 million per game and Hanshin for ¥50 million, but 
Chunichi did the same for only ¥10 million, Nippon Ham for ¥3.8 million, 
Seibu Lions for ¥700,000, and Chiba Lotte for a mere ¥150,000.96  Critics 
place the blame for this anachronistic business model on the Yomiuri 
corporation’s unwillingness to cede control as the most powerful team in 
NPB.97 
Another area in which there is a significant difference between MLB 
and NPB is in their playing facilities.  Whereas most MLB teams either 
own their own playing facilities or have very favorable lease agreements 
that allow them to control most of the revenue generated by the facility, 
NPB teams generally do not own their stadiums (though Seibu does, and 
yet it still loses money) or control ancillary revenue streams, such as 
concessions and sponsorships, and must pay hefty rents for their facilities.98 
NPB teams are slowly beginning to become more focused on the 
business side of the game.  For example, following the lead of the SoftBank 
Hawks, all of NPB’s Pacific League teams are now streaming their home 
games live over the internet for free, the Chiba Lotte Marines are running 
pre- and post-game promotions,99 and the league adopted interleague play 
in 2005 and postseason playoffs leading up to the Japan Series in 2007.100  
In addition, mimicking the longstanding practice of North American sports 
leagues, which have allowed their media rights fees to grow exponentially 
over time, all of the Pacific League teams sold their broadcasting rights to a 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Robert Whiting, NPB Needs Major Reform, Vision to Prosper Like MLB, JAPAN 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070413c1.html.  The NPB 
league office’s only revenue is derived from an ¥80 million assessment on each team, the 
league All-Star Game, and the Japan Series.  Id. 
 96. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 97. Whiting, supra note 95. 
 98. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 99. Whiting, supra note 95. 
 100. Id. 
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subsidiary of SoftBank, which in turn negotiated with broadcasting stations 
to give licenses.  Though the price agreements reached in these deals are 
not made public, the Pacific League should see a long-term increase in its 
rights fees if the North American leagues are any indication.  These efforts 
are all an attempt to generate more revenues from the on-field product. 
There are also significant differences in player development between 
the Japanese and American professional leagues.  Most MLB teams have 
six minor league teams with a total of 125-150 players in their farm 
systems at any one time.  This arrangement cost the average MLB team 
more than $20 million in 2007.101  American minor leaguers spend more 
time playing games than they do practicing.  In contrast, there is 
comparatively little investment by NPB teams in the Japanese minor league 
system.  Each team only has seventy players in its minor league system, 
and just one farm team that plays close to 100 games each season. 102  
Japanese minor leaguers spend most of their time practicing rather than 
playing games.103 
While it could be a reflection of different philosophies of player 
development, it is likely that NPB parent companies do not want to spend 
the money on their minor league systems as their American counterparts 
do.104  This has a huge impact on player development in Japan and has 
resulted in a dearth of young stars available to replace players who leave 
Japan for MLB.105 
It appears that NPB needs a revamped structure where the clubs are 
treated as profit-oriented businesses in and of themselves and league 
operations are more centralized.106  In addition, although it is highly likely 
that the top Japanese players will continue to leave for MLB, if Japan and 
NPB can improve player development to produce more highly skilled 
players107, and complement them with quality players from other Asian 
countries, then NPB will be well-positioned to monetize its fan base and 
remain a viable business.108  Such a business model is reminiscent of many 
 
 101. Andrew Zimbalist, There’s More Than Meets the Eye in Determining Players’ 
Salary Shares, SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at 44, available at 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/58351. 
 102. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Whiting, supra note 95. 
 105. Whiting, supra note 57. 
 106. Whiting, supra note 95. 
 107. Whiting, supra note 69. 
 108. Id.  While this is certainly a possibility, there is a strong argument that importing 
other Asian players is not a good answer.  Even if the talent level of the players that left 
NPB and of the players who came to NPB are about the same, it is likely that Japanese fans 
will not support non-Japanese players to the same degree, such that fan interest in NPB will 
decrease. This has already been proven in part by Yomiuri’s attempt to replace Hideki 
Matsui with Seung-Yeop Lee, a Korean slugger.  Though the two players are considered by 
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successful domestic soccer leagues around the world; while the local 
leagues cannot compete with the top European leagues in England, Spain, 
Italy, Germany, and France, they remain financially viable nonetheless.109 
Despite NPB’s aforementioned problems, it is unclear what incentive 
individual NPB owners have to change the posting system.110  The system 
works well for the many teams in need of a cash infusion.111  As a result, 
many NPB owners will be reluctant to make substantial changes to the 
posting system. 
E.   The Possible Tazawa Effect 
While the protocol agreement between MLB and NPB establishes the 
posting process as the transfer process for NPB players with less than nine 
years of service, allowing NPB players to leave for MLB without 
compensation after nine years of NPB service, the two leagues have no 
formal agreement regarding the status of Japanese amateur players who 
have not yet been drafted by NPB teams.112  Junichi Tazawa, a 22 year-old 
Japanese pitcher, became the first Japanese amateur player to publicly 
announce his desire to forgo NPB in favor of MLB.  He requested that he 
not be drafted in the Japanese system after he led his Nippon Oil team to 
the semifinals of the Japanese corporate league championship.113  Despite 
 
many to be of relatively equal talent and ability, their popularity among Japanese fans 
cannot be compared.  See e.g., NPB Tracker,  A Look at Yomiuri’s Import Roster, July 11, 
2009, http://www.npbtracker.com/2009/07/a-look-at-yomiuris-import-roster/ (discussing 
Lee’s baseball statistics); NPB Tracker, The Effects of NPB Players Leaving for MLB, Part 
3, Dec. 14, 2008, http://www.npbtracker.com/2008/12/the-effects-of-npb-players-leaving-
for-mlb-part-3/#content (describing the impact that Matsui’s departure had on the field and 
in the team’s popularity).  This is one of the reasons why television ratings for Yomiuri 
games decreased.  Robert Whiting, Baseball in Japan: Not All Cheers, TIME, Mar. 27, 2008 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1725911,00.html. Another reason why 
Japanese fans are unlikely to embrace foreign players is that the league has adopted rules 
throughout its history that substantially limit the number of foreign players on their teams’ 
game day rosters.  Japanese Baseball Frequently Asked Questions, Foreign Player 
Restrictions?, http://www.japanesebaseball.com/faq/gaijin.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).  
Currently, Japanese teams only are allowed to have four players on their twenty-five man 
roster.  Id.  Thus, Japanese fans have enjoyed games played by almost-exclusively Japanese 
players for as long as they can remember. 
 109. Whiting, supra note 69. 
 110. Robert Whiting, Foreign Managers Change Face of Japanese Game, JAPAN TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2007, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/sb20070412c1.html. 
 111. See id. (showing how NPB teams are making millions of dollars on posting fees). 
 112. Alan Schwarz & Brad Lefton, Japanese Are Irked by U.S. Interest in Pitcher, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at B12. 
 113. Japan Tries to Discourage Amateurs from Playing in MLB with Ban, ESPN.COM, 
Oct. 8, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3632083; Kaz Tadano and Mac 
Suzuki are the only Japanese players to have played in MLB without previous NPB 
experience.  Id. 
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pre-draft speculation that he would be the first player selected,114 NPB 
teams ultimately agreed to his request and he went undrafted.115  Tazawa 
subsequently signed a three-year contract worth approximately $3 million 
with the Boston Red Sox.116 
 Despite the lack of any formal agreement regarding amateur players, 
Japanese baseball executives were understandably upset with this 
development.  The Tazawa affair has strained the relationship between 
NPB and MLB.117  NPB officials view the signing of Japanese amateur 
players by MLB teams as a violation of a well-established understanding.  
As NPB stated in a news release, “This was more than just a gentlemen’s 
agreement, but rather an implicit understanding that the major leagues 
would do no such thing.  That a handful of clubs from the majors is trying 
to break this gentlemen’s agreement is truly regrettable.”118  In an attempt 
to disincentivize other players from following in Tazawa’s footsteps, NPB 
adopted a rule that bans amateur players who sign with foreign professional 
teams from playing in NPB for three years upon their return to Japan if 
they sign out of high school, or for two years if they sign out of college or 
the corporate league.119  Rob Manfred, MLB’s executive vice president for 
labor relations, responded, “I’m sure we will have ongoing conversation[s] 
with them about how we might be able to address their concerns.”120 
How Tazawa fares in the United States could influence the movement 
of Japanese amateurs to MLB.121  If he is successful, there will undoubtedly 
 
 114. Tazawa to Pass on Japanese Draft, Deal With MLB Teams,  ESPN.COM, Sept. 12, 
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3583362. 
 115. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112. 
 116. Report: Japanese Pitcher Tazawa Agrees to Three-year Deal With Red Sox, 
ESPN.COM, Dec. 1, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3736390. 
 117. See Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112 (stating that Japanese teams were upset with 
MLB when MLB teams were trying to lure Tazawa to MLB).  Though the issue was 
discussed at the annual MLB general managers meeting in November of 2008, there has 
been no action as of this writing.  Jimmie Lee Solomon, MLB executive vice president of 
baseball operations, stated, “We’re sitting down with the various commissioner’s offices 
from the various countries and talking with them about our protocol agreements, but nothing 
definitive.”  Selig Warns GMs About Economic Turmoil as Meetings Begin, ESPN.COM, 
Nov. 4, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3682935. 
 118. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112.  Interestingly, several major league teams agree 
that Tazawa should not have been signed.  New York Yankees General Manager Brian 
Cashman stated, “I’m old school—there has been an understanding.  There’s been a reason 
that Japanese amateurs haven’t been signed in the past, so we consider him hands off.”  Id.  
To this difference in opinion, Rob Manfred stated, “It’s not due to any lack of clarity – it’s 
just due to the fact that clubs have different views of the world.”  Id. 
 119. Id.; Japan Tries to Discourage Amateurs from Playing in MLB with Ban, supra note 
113. 
 120. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112. 
 121. See Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 
3: The Tazawa Effect, ASIAN-AM. SPORTS EXAMINER, Dec. 4, 2008, 
http://www.examiner.com/x-739-AsianAmerican-Sports-Examiner~y2008m12d4-A-brief-
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be others who attempt to follow.  If he is not, MLB teams will be (at least 
temporarily) more resistant to the practice.  At the same time, Japanese 
players may not be nearly as enthusiastic about moving to MLB, 
considering the ban they would face if they returned to Japan.122 
Despite an array of opinions by MLB teams regarding the signing of 
Japanese amateurs, the competitive nature of MLB requires a timely 
solution of this issue.  It is unlikely that teams will allow themselves to be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage out of deference to an unwritten rule.  
Los Angeles Dodgers general manager Ned Colletti stated, “[t]here’s a fine 
line between falling behind the competition because you’re quote being 
respectful, and competing like others will compete.  We have to be wise in 
our decision-making at the moment of truth.”123 
The possibility of increased movement of amateur players from Japan 
to the United States places NPB in a precarious position, as it would further 
drain the Japanese system of talent.124  With top veteran players leaving by 
means of the posting system and top young amateur talent leaving by 
means of free agency, NPB’s supply of talent could become a barrel tapped 
at both ends.  Ultimately, this could have a meaningful impact on NPB in 
two different ways.  First, a significantly depleted talent pool could have an 
effect on NPB revenues, as fans may migrate away from a league with a 
decreased caliber of play.  Second, there could be fewer talented players 
available for posting because they would have already left Japan as 
amateurs.  NPB teams would thus face a long-term loss of posting 
revenues. 
The above prospects could provide NPB teams with the incentive 
necessary to change the system.  If Tazawa’s move has an impact on other 
young players, MLB could have leverage to negotiate a more favorable 
posting agreement with NPB.  A proposed trade off could be an agreement 
by MLB not to sign Japanese amateurs in exchange for a change in the 
posting agreement to one of the alternatives suggested in Part V.  Absent 
that, it is likely to be difficult to convince NPB to consider an alternative to 
the current player transfer system, despite the aforementioned arguments. 
 
history-of-JapaneseAmerican-baseball-relations-Part-3-The-Tazawa-Effect (discussing how 
Tazawa’s performance in MLB will impact how many future Japanese players decide to 
play in America). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 112. 
 124. To this point, Yomiuri official Hidetoshi Kiyotake recently wrote in Japan’s 
Weekly Baseball magazine of how South Korea’s major league system had been damaged 
by the loss of thirty-eight players who signed directly with MLB teams since 1994.  He 
wrote that “[u]nless fans here stand up and proclaim, ‘protect Japanese baseball,’ we’re 
liable to fall into the same trap as South Korean baseball.”  Schwarz & Lefton, supra note 
112. 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL PLAYER TRANSFER 
Various player transfer systems exist to facilitate the global movement 
of athletes across professional sports leagues.  The following describes the 
various systems for the transfer of professional athletes in basketball, 
soccer, and hockey, all of which are possible alternatives to the current 
MLB-NPB transfer system. 
A.   Basketball 
The ability for professional basketball players to move to a team in 
another country is governed by regulations set out by the International 
Basketball Federation (“FIBA”).  These standards are permissive and focus 
on facilitation of player transfer. 
The governing regulations state that “[a]ny basketball player shall 
have the right to play basketball in any country in the world, within the 
limits established by . . . FIBA . . . .”125  The process by which this occurs is 
relatively straightforward.  A player seeking transfer to a team in a foreign 
country must receive a “letter of clearance” from the national basketball 
governing body in his home country.126  This letter details the player’s 
playing history and includes an attestation by the player that he has fulfilled 
“all contractual obligations stipulated in any and all contracts between 
[him]self and any team . . . .” (emphasis added).127  Once a player receives 
the letter of clearance, the only way that the letter can be rejected by the 
national governing body is if that individual player has not fulfilled his 
contractual obligations to his transferee team.128  In essence, the letter of 
clearance is the final step towards a successful transfer of the player to a 
team in another country. 
As it pertains to the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), the 
rights to international players may be acquired through the annual NBA 
Draft, an option not available to MLB teams wishing to acquire players 
from NPB or most of the rest of the world.  NBA teams are free to draft 
any player who meets the requirements of Article X of the NBA Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (“NBA CBA”).129  Once the NBA team has drafted 
 
 125. Fed’n Int’l Basketball Ass’n, REGULATION H – RULES GOVERNING PLAYERS, 
COACHES, SUPPORT OFFICIALS, AND PLAYERS’ AGENTS 66, 70 (2008) [hereinafter REG. H]. 
 126. Id. at 71. 
 127. USA BASKETBALL APPLICATION FOR LETTER OF CLEARANCE INSTRUCTIONS,  
available at http://www.usabasketball.com/loc-application.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 128. REG. H, supra note 125, at 71. 
 129. NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. X:  Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, 
http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles/article-X.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter NBA 
CBA].  Just like every domestic player drafted by the NBA, an international player must be 
at least nineteen years old during the calendar year of the draft.  However, the NBA CBA 
ROSNERFINAL_FOUR 1/22/2010  5:12:21 PM 
104 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
the rights to a player, the team has exclusive negotiation rights with that 
player for a period of one year.130 
In both of the acquisition situations—where a player requests a letter 
of clearance to join a foreign team and where that player is drafted by an 
NBA team (after acquiring the letter of clearance)—the individual player is 
the party negotiating with his own team for his release from any current 
contract.  Perhaps the highest profile international transfer to date is that of 
Yao Ming.  The Chinese star was drafted as the number one pick in 2002 
by the NBA’s Houston Rockets, at which time the Rockets began 
discussions with Yao’s Chinese team for his contractual release 
(discussions also included Chinese officials because of Yao’s required 
playing service to the Chinese national team).131  Ultimately, the Rockets 
paid Yao’s former team a $350,000 transfer fee for the ability to sign Yao 
to an NBA contract.132  Unlike the MLB-NPB transfer agreement, where 
the acquiring team is bidding for the rights to negotiate with the player 
(which operates as the buy-out provision of the player’s contract), the 
FIBA system allows for the two teams to directly negotiate with one 
another, a more efficient process than the first-price bidding.133  The player 
transferred to the NBA is then free to negotiate a playing contract within 
the confines of the NBA CBA with the team possessing his rights.134 
B.  Hockey135 
1.  Background 
The National Hockey League (“NHL”) workforce was predominantly 
North American until the 1972—73 season when a group of Swedish 
players became regular contributors to NHL teams.136  The initial influx of 
 
exempts all “international players” from the requirement that “at least one (1) NBA Season 
has elapsed since the player’s graduation from high school . . . .”  Id. at sec. 1.  Instead, the 
international player must fulfill the 19-years old requirement, and “express his desire to be 
selected in the Draft in a writing received by the NBA at least sixty (60) days prior to such 
Draft.”  Id. 
 130. Id. at sec. 5. 
 131. See Josh Tyrangiel, The NBA’s Center of Attention, TIME, Feb. 10, 2003, at 68, 
(explaining Chinese officials’ involvement in Yao’s move to the NBA). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See discussion supra Part IV, Section A (discussing FIBA’s player transfer process 
and associated regulations). 
 134. NBA CBA, supra note 129, at sec. 7. 
 135. At the time this paper was written, the NHL and the International Ice Hockey 
Federation (“IIHF”) had agreed to open their existing player transfer agreement in an 
attempt to renegotiate the terms. 
 136. INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, IIHF STUDY ON EUROPEANS GOING TO NORTH AM. 5 
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European players was limited to Swedes and Finns for approximately 
fifteen years until the fall of the Iron Curtain, when Russian, Czech, and 
eventually Slovak players began to migrate to the NHL.137  In the 2007–08 
season, over thirty-three percent of players who appeared on an NHL roster 
hailed from outside of North America.138 
Because modern hockey has a global labor market, it is critical for 
international hockey to have a transfer agreement in place to regulate and 
control the flow of players across international leagues.  The NHL, the 
National Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”), and the 
International Ice Hockey Federation (“IIHF”) and its member hockey 
associations reached their first Player Transfer Agreement in 2001.139  
Covering the 2001-04 seasons, this agreement regulated the transfer of 
players from one national league to another, although this transfer 
happened primarily when players moved from non-North American teams 
to teams within the NHL.140  The agreement provided that an NHL team 
would compensate its European counterpart whenever a European player 
was signed.141  This arrangement led to NHL teams paying European teams 
$28.8 million for the right to sign 185 players during the covered term.142  
This deal was followed by a two-year agreement that began after the 
conclusion of the 2004-05 NHL lockout.143  Notably, however, the Russian 
Ice Hockey Federation opted not to participate in the second agreement due 
to its dissatisfaction with the financial compensation owed by the NHL 
team upon signing the player, limitations on the number of players that 
could be signed, and the deadline for signing such players.144  This two-
year deal was followed by an agreement that again excluded the Russian 
Federation and was scheduled to be in effect over the 2007-11 seasons.145  
However, the European nations exercised a contractual right to re-open the 
deal after the 2007-08 season.146  As of this writing, no new agreement has 
 
(2006), available at http://www.iihf.com/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/IIHF_Study.pdf 
[hereinafter IIHF STUDY]. 
 137. Id. 
 138. NHL International, supra note 2. 
 139. IIHF, Zherdev Last Player to Sign Under Expiring IIHF-NHL-NHLPA Deal, 
http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr4003.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2009). 
 140. Jeffrey P. Gleason, Comment, From Russia with Love: The Legal Repercussions of 
the Recruitment and Contracting of Foreign Players in the National Hockey League, 56 
BUFF. L. REV. 599, 604 (2008). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 605. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Canadian Press, Six Countries Ratify IIHF Agreement, July 13, 2007, 
http://www.tsn.ca/nhl/news_story/?ID=213424&hubname=nhl. 
 146. Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, IIHF-NHL Transfer Agreement Re-opened, Dec. 13, 2007, 
http://www.iihf.com. 
ROSNERFINAL_FOUR 1/22/2010  5:12:21 PM 
106 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
been reached.  While there have been no negotiations of late with the 
Russian Federation,147 the other European nations are still in talks with the 
NHL.148 
2.  Problems with the Previous Transfer Agreement 
The initial IIHF Player Transfer Agreement, along with the NHL-
NHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“NHL-NHLPA CBA”), 
governed the global movement of players, with the specific intention of 
compensating non-NHL teams when their star players left for the riches of 
the NHL.  Players who were not currently under contract with an IIHF 
team were free to sign with any NHL team that they wished (or any other 
team for that matter).149  If however, an NHL team drafted and signed a 
player while that player was under contract with an IIHF team (or while an 
IIHF team held the player’s rights) from a federation that had signed the 
Player Transfer Agreement, the NHL paid that country’s governing body a 
fee of about $200,000 in exchange for that player being free to leave his 
contract and come to the NHL.150  This was in addition to the value of the 
playing contract that the player ultimately signed with the NHL club.151 
For many European nations, and for the Russian Federation in 
 
 147. Jeff Klein & Stu Hackel, Chiding N.H.L. for Not Committing to 2014 Games, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at SP8. 
 148. Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Global Agreement Coming Closer, Oct. 1, 2008, 
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/article/global-agreement-
coming-closer.html?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&cHash=e7ce908d1d [hereinafter Global 
Agreement Coming Closer].  However, there is little optimism that a deal is forthcoming in 
the near future.  Peter Gudmundson, managing director of the Swedish Hockey League, 
stated, “I don’t think there will be a new transfer agreement now.  I don’t know if there will 
be an agreement in the future.  If there will be an agreement in the future, I think it will take 
some years.”  Allan Hougaard, IIHF Transfer Agreement Falls Apart After Czechs Opt Not 
to Extend Deal, THE HOCKEY NEWS, May 1, 2008, 
http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/15728-IIHF-transfer-agreement-falls-apart-after-
Czechs-opt-not-to-extend-deal.html. 
 149. See Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Life Without a Transfer Deal, June 16, 2008, 
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/browse/2/article/life-without-
a-transfer-deal.html? (explaining how NHL teams may acquire “free-agent” players from 
Europe) [hereinafter Life Without a Transfer Deal]. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Unlike the NBA, which requires that international players be 19 years old before 
being permitted in the draft, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 129, the 
NHL-NHLPA CBA only stipulates that “[a]ll Players age 18 or older are eligible for claim 
in the Entry Draft . . . ” where “‘age 18’ means a [p]layer reaching his eighteenth birthday 
between January 1 next preceding the Entry Draft and September 15 next following the 
Entry Draft, both dates included . . . .”  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, ART. 
8, SECS. 4, 10, July 22, 2005, available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf 
[hereinafter NHL-NHLPA CBA]. 
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particular, the problem with the previous system was the perceived 
inadequacy of the payment for players.  The $200,000 fee was deemed 
insufficient to compensate the former club for the loss of talented star 
players such as Evgeni Malkin and Alexander Ovechkin.152  Russian Ice 
Hockey Federation president Vladislav Tretiak stated, “‘Russian teams 
would rather lose players to the NHL for nothing than sign a contract that 
pays them what they consider a disrespectful amount of money . . . .’”153  
Russia did not sign either the 2005-07 or 2007-11 IIHF-NHL Player 
Transfer Agreements.  As a result, the NHL, the Russian Federation, and 
the players were not bound by the terms of the Player Transfer Agreement 
when a Russian player was drafted by an NHL team.154  When star players  
Malkin (second overall pick in the 2004 NHL Draft) and Ovechkin (first 
overall pick in the 2004 NHL Draft) joined the NHL, their former teams 
did not receive any compensation because no agreement existed.155  The 
lack of Russian participation in the Player Transfer Agreement signaled a 
problem that is the complete opposite of that faced by NPB and MLB.156  In 
hockey, the transferee team receives too little compensation. 
Though the controversy centers primarily around compensation, the 
European federations have other issues surrounding player transfer 
agreements.  First, the fact that many players leave the European leagues 
and languish in North American minor leagues without ever making it to 
the NHL indicates that NHL clubs have been stockpiling young European 
players in their minor league systems.157  In the 2007 – 08 season, there 
were fifty-nine European players who signed with NHL teams:  six played 
in the NHL that season, seven were returned to their European teams, and 
forty-six played in North American minor leagues.158  One underlying 
reason for this stockpiling is a clause in the 2005 NHL-NHLPA CBA that 
 
 152. See Gennady Fyodorov, Russians Ready to Say “Nyet” to NHL Transfer Deal, 
REUTERS, May 8, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idUSL088285920070508 (explaining the RIHF 
rejected a new transfer agreement with the NHL because it felt its teams were not being 
properly compensated when players left for the NHL. 
 153. Gleason, supra note 140, at 606 (citing NHL.com, Russians Turn Down Transfer 
Agreement, Club Teams Want More Respect, May 9, 2007,  
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?articleid=305462&page=NewsPage&service=page). 
 154. See John Dellapina, Ranger Pick is Russian Over, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 24, 
2007, at 63 (discussing how the New York Rangers worked to draft a top Russian player). 
 155. See Fyodorov, supra note 152 (discussing the Russian Ice Hockey Federation’s 
response to Malkin and Ovechkin’s transfers). 
 156. See discussion supra Part III (discussing transfers between NPB and MLB). 
 157. See Int’l Ice Hockey Fed’n, Q & A with René Fasel, Dec. 17, 2007, 
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/article/q-a-with-rene-
fasel.html (noting that NHL teams sign many European players before they are ready to play 
in the NHL) [hereinafter Q & A with René Fasel] . 
 158. Id. 
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requires players to be signed by June 1 of the calendar year following the 
year in which they were drafted.159  The European federations believe that 
this system has a deleterious effect on player development as young players 
leaving their home environments prematurely may never reach their 
potential.160  In addition, the European teams lose the services of young 
talented players who could become attractions in their home countries 
instead of playing in North American minor leagues for a few seasons.161  
The 2007-11 Player Transfer Agreement requires that a player under the 
age of twenty, who is under contract with an IIHF team, be offered back to 
his European team; the European federations would like to increase this age 
requirement to twenty-two.162 
The second concern for the European federations involves the transfer 
deadline for players to sign with NHL teams.163  The European teams found 
it difficult to replace players who went to the NHL for the upcoming season 
due to the fifteenth of June deadline that existed under the previous 
agreement; thus, they would prefer an earlier deadline that allows them 
ample time to find a replacement.164 
The third issue for the European federations is related to 
compensation.165  Transfer fees under the previous agreements were paid in 
American dollars, but the decline of the dollar against the Euro and other 
European currencies means that the $200,000 fees were worth substantially 
less in 2007 than they were in 2005.166  Given these concerns, the European 
federations are in search of corrective measures.167 
 
 159. NHL-NHLPA CBA, supra note 151, at art. 8, sec. 6.  This is a change from the 
previous agreement where the NHL team had the right to the player so long as he played in 
Europe.  See CBA BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, ART. 8, SEC.6(c)(1997).  Thus, under the previous NHL-NHLPA 
CBA there was less incentive to sign young European players to contracts because the NHL 
teams retained their rights for an extended period of time, allowing the NHL team to follow 
a player’s development and sign him to a contract only if he was deemed a true prospect. 
 160. Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157. 
 161. See Id. (discussing the problems relating to European players playing in North 
American minor leagues in large numbers). 
 162. First round draft picks would be exempted from this requirement.  See Int’l Ice 
Hockey Fed’n, NHL/NHLPA Responsive to IIHF Concerns About Too Many Young 
European Players Going to Minor Leagues, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.iihf.com (discussing 
how the NHL, NHLPA, and IIHF are trying to alleviate IIHF concerns about the number of 
European players playing for NHL minor league teams). 
 163. Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  The dollar declined in value by approximately one-third from 2002 – 07, though 
it has been resurgent recently. Peter Gumbel, Why Europe Should Stop Whining, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 7, 2007, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/15/magazines/fortune/gumbel_euro.fortune/index.htm. 
 167. Id. 
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3.  Implications of the Absence of a Player Transfer Agreement 
Fifty-one Russians played in the NHL in the 2005-06 season while the 
rights to forty-one Russian players were transferred to NHL teams under 
the 2001 – 04 Player Transfer Agreement.168  In addition, thirteen Russian 
players signed contracts with NHL teams under the 2005-07 Player 
Transfer Agreement.  However, the exclusion of the Russian Federation 
from the 2005-07 agreement made these transfers ‘free’ as NHL teams paid 
no compensation to their Russian counterparts for signing their players.  
Under the agreement, NHL teams would have been required to pay $2.6 
million in fees.169  The expiration of the most recent Player Transfer 
Agreement means all European hockey teams now face the potential loss of 
their players to NHL teams without compensation.170  If NHL teams were 
to sign fifty-nine European players, as they did in the 2007-08 season,171 
they would save $11.8 million.172 
There is also the possibility of the unregulated landscape leading to a 
lack of mutual respect of contracts.  Such behavior may lead to teams 
signing (or “stealing”) players who have valid and binding contracts with 
other teams.173  This has already occurred with a handful of players who 
signed with Russian teams despite having valid contracts with NHL teams.  
Most notably, Alexander Radulov of the NHL’s Nashville Predators signed 
a deal with Salavat Yulayev Ufa of the Russian Kontinental Hockey 
League (”KHL”) despite the fact that his contract with Nashville had not 
expired.174  An IIHF investigation found the existence of a valid contract 
with Nashville but also determined that the IIHF did not have the power to 
sanction Radulov from playing hockey in a domestic league due to its 
bylaws and the absence of a valid player transfer agreement between the 
NHL and the Russian Federation.175 
 
 168. Gleason, supra note 140, at 605 (citing IIHF STUDY, supra note 136 and Int’l Ice 
Hockey Fed’n, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement Involving Six Euro Countries, 
http://www.iihf.com/news/iihfpr8405.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)). 
 169. Gleason, supra note 140, at n.42 (citing NHL.com, Russians Turn Down Transfer 
Agreement, Club Teams Want More Respect, May 9, 2007, 
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/app?articleid=305462&page=NewsPage&service=page).  This 
figure is calculated by multiplying the number of players signed (thirteen) by the $200,000 
fee due under the 2006-07 Player Transfer Agreement. 
 170. See Q & A with René Fasel, supra note 157 (exploring the benefits and risks of re-
opening negotiations for a Player Transfer Agreement). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Fifty-nine players at $200,000 per player. 
 173. See Global Agreement Coming Closer, supra note 148 (discussing the investigation 
of Alexander Radulov who signed with a Russian team while under contract with an NHL 
team). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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While the Russian Federation would prefer a system similar to that in 
international soccer that would require the NHL teams to negotiate directly 
with Russian teams over the terms of player transfers, the NHL has 
understandably balked at such a request.176  The NHL-NHLPA CBA 
prohibits NHL teams from negotiating directly with European clubs and 
prevents circumvention of this clause through threats of severe penalties, 
including significant fines and loss of draft picks.177  Any prolonged period 
without a Player Transfer Agreement could impact the number of European 
players selected in the NHL entry draft, with NHL teams reluctant to waste 
valuable draft picks on players who they may be unable to sign.  This 
scenario has already manifested itself with Russian players:  only fifteen 
were selected in the 2006 NHL entry draft and nine in both the 2007 and 
2008 versions, compared with forty-four in 2000.178 
The NHL and its teams, the KHL and other European leagues, the 
various European federations, and the players themselves will all feel the 
long-term impact of a period without a player transfer agreement.  
Although NHL teams are realizing the savings of a free transfer system in 
the near term, the long-term costs could be troublesome.  If the migration 
of talented European players to the NHL slows dramatically—as has 
already happened with Russians—the drop-off in talent may be reflected in 
lower quality of play.  This drop in talent, in turn, could have a negative 
impact on league revenues, as fans might find NHL hockey less 
entertaining.  Nonetheless, if the most talented Europeans continue to 
pursue their dreams of playing in the top hockey league in the world and 
securing the larger contracts that come with it, then this drop in revenues is 
unlikely to occur.  Conversely, while the KHL and other European leagues 
would certainly lose out on the compensation received when their top 
players are lost, they could see an increase in their overall quality of play as 
more players choose to stay at home.  The increased quality of play would 
make the sport more attractive to consumers and revenues would be 
expected to increase.  This is likely to be of some benefit to the KHL as it 
 
 176. See Life Without a Transfer Deal, supra note 149 (describing the Russian 
Federation’s concerns with the Player Transfer Agreement); See also Eric McEriain, 
Russian Hockey Plans a Resurgence, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008, 
http://www.sportingnews.com/yourturn/viewtopic.php?t=347960 (explaining the Russian 
Federation’s preference for a player transfer system similar to that used in international 
soccer leagues). 
 177. Life Without a Transfer Deal, supra note 149. 
 178. Simon Richard, 2008 Prospects: Nikita Filatov, HOCKEY’S FUTURE, Jan. 4, 2008, 
http://www.hockeysfuture.com/articles/10114/2008_prospects_nikita_filatov/; See also 
Eugene Belashchenko, 2008 Russian Draft Review, HOCKEY’S FUTURE, July 11, 2008, 
http://www.hockeysfuture.com/articles/10485/russian2008_draft_review/ (evaluating the 
2008 NHL Russian draft picks). 
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attempts to grow.179  Ultimately, the KHL could compete with the NHL to 
become the top hockey league in the world, if it is successful in the long-
term in developing young Russian players, keeping them at home, and 
attracting talented European players.  Not surprisingly, the dispute between 
the NHL, KHL, and the Russian Federation over the Player Transfer 
Agreement is most likely about each league’s desire to create an 
increasingly global product and realize the attendant revenue increase. 
 Ice hockey is very popular in many European countries, but this 
popularity is currently monetized by the domestic professional hockey 
leagues in these nations rather than by the NHL or KHL.  Though the NHL 
has long attempted to tap the European market, it has increased these 
efforts substantially in recent years.  In addition to playing regular season 
games in select cities, the NHL has established the Victoria Cup preseason 
competition and participates in a marketing partnership with the European 
Champions Hockey League.180  These efforts could be a prelude to the 
NHL investing in the Champions Hockey League and eventually placing 
franchises in Europe.  Though still in its infancy, the KHL is similarly 
eyeing a future European expansion.181 
Despite all of this activity, if a player transfer agreement does not 
come to fruition, the players themselves could be the biggest long-term 
losers.  Though salaries could increase due to the presence of multiple 
bidders for their services, players may suffer.  In the absence of a player 
transfer agreement that establishes a smooth bidding process, it could be far 
more difficult for them to be able to play for the team and in the league that 
they desire.  In addition, there is currently no agreement for the NHL to 
allow its players to participate in the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Russia, as 
they have done since the Nagano Games in 1998.  The Russian Federation 
would obviously greatly prefer that the best players be available to 
participate in what will be one of the showcase events of the Games.  
However, given the tenuous relationship between the NHL, KHL, and the 
 
 179. A replacement for the Russian Super League, the KHL launched as a twenty-four-
team league in 2008-09 with the support of Gazprom and other state-controlled companies 
that invested a reported $100 million at the behest of President Vladimir Putin.  Putin views 
the league as a matter of national pride.  Teams play a 56-game schedule and have a $24.5 
million salary cap, excluding foreign players (of whom there are ninety-seven throughout 
the KHL).  Each team is limited to five foreigners, who are frequently given free use of cars 
and apartments and whose salaries are paid in U.S. dollars that are subject only to a thirteen 
percent Russian tax.  See Rick Westhead, Does Russia's Kontinental League Threaten 
NHL?, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 14, 2008, 
http://www.thestar.com/Sports/Hockey/article/553524 (discussing the first year of the 
KHL). 
 180. NHL Strikes Marketing Alliance with Champions League Hockey, NAT’L POST, 
Nov. 25, 1998, http://www.nationalpost.com/sports/story.html?id=991139. 
 181. Russian League Takes Action to Boost Clubs, SPORTS BUS. J., Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/61559. 
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Russian Federation, NHL player participation in the 2014 Olympic 
tournament is anything but certain.  It is clear that a ‘Cold War’ in 
international hockey leads to multilateral losses in the long-term and must 
be remedied. 
C. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) 
 There are few similarities, as well as numerous differences, between 
the European soccer transfer system and the baseball posting system.182  
The transfer of European soccer players from one team to another closely 
resembles a free market system and is more efficient than any of the 
aforementioned systems.  In the Union of European Football Associations 
(“UEFA”), the transferor183 team is permitted to conduct a direct business-
to-business negotiation with the transferee team.184  Although there are 
restrictions governing which players may be transferred, the fact that more 
than one transferor team can solicit the services of the individual player 
allows for the possibility of an ascending price auction.185 
 In similar fashion to the MLB-NPB posting process, following the 
conclusion of the playing season, individual teams produce a list of players 
who are available for transfer to other clubs.186  These players are currently 
under contract to the listing club, and, without being transferred, would be 
forced to play out the duration of their contracts with their current club.187  
Once the player is eligible to be transferred (i.e., his name has been listed 
by his current club), and there is another team interested in acquiring the 
player, then the two teams can begin negotiating the transfer price of the 
player.188  The final transfer value is determined based on these direct 
negotiations.189 
An interesting component of the UEFA system also addresses the 
apprehension felt by the Europeans under the former NHL-IIHF agreement:  
compensation for the training of younger players.  A specific formula is in 
 
 182. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
 183. In this discussion, the transferor team is the team soliciting the transferee team’s 
player. 
 184. Id. at 7. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Thomas M. Schiera, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow 
European Football to Reestablish the Competitive Balance that It Helped Destroy?, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 709, 713 (2007). 
 187. Id. at 714.  Before the decision in Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football 
Assoc. ASBL v. Bosman,  Case C-415/93, 1995 I-4921, was handed down by the European 
Court of Justice, players whose contracts had expired were also subject to the restrictions of 
the transfer system.  Id.  The Court invalidated the transfer system as it applied to players 
whose contracts with the listing team had already expired.  Id. at 716. 
 188. Id. at 713-14. 
 189. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
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place to determine extra compensation paid to a transferee team when a 
player under the age of twenty-three is being transferred.190  This formulaic 
compensation only applies to the transfer of players under this age 
threshold, but the system is in place in order to compensate the typically 
lower-revenue clubs for the development, and subsequent loss, of star 
players transferring to typically higher-revenue teams.191 The loss of 
promising young players, who tend to be less expensive than older players 
of comparable skill, especially if they have not yet attained free agency, 
can promote competitive imbalance where the transferee teams are 
typically smaller, lower-revenue clubs.  Thus, the extra payment for players 
under age twenty-three seeks to remedy the perceived imbalance that could 
result from these transfers of players. 
In the absence of the additional payment for younger players, teams 
are free to negotiate whatever transfer fee they can for their players.  There 
are currently two windows during the year that teams can transfer players:  
one window during the summer and another during the middle of the 
playing season.192  Historically, teams assigned a transfer value to each of 
the players who had been listed for transfer.193  Unlike the baseball transfer 
system, where the bidding teams must bid in secrecy in a sealed bid 
auction, UEFA’s system allows for more full market participation, because 
each of the interested teams will know the transfer price attached to the 
player by the listing team.  Football teams can negotiate with an unlimited 
number of other teams over the transfer fee, and the result is typically a 
winning bid that is minimally above the next highest bid.194  The 
inefficiencies of the MLB system, where, for example, the Red Sox bid 
almost $12 million more than the next highest bidder for Matsuzaka, would 
never occur in the UEFA system; the winner would theoretically bid just $1 
more than the next highest bidder. 
 Much like the NBA system, the transferee team and the individual 
player are the beneficiaries of this type of transfer system.  Though the 
transferee team loses the services of a player who has marketable skills, it 
nonetheless receives financial compensation for this loss.  Given the 
alternative—that the player leaves via free agency after the expiration of 
his contract without any compensation being paid to his former team—
 
 190. Schiera, supra note 186, at 717. 
 191. Id.  Furthermore, should a player under the age of twenty-three be transferred 
before his contract has been completed, an additional payment is to be made.  The rules 
require that five percent of the transfer fee paid to the listing team be distributed among the 
teams for whom the player was a member between his twelfth and twenty-third birthdays.  
Id. at 718. 
 192. Id. at 717. 
 193. James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle over European Football’s Transfer System, 
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 669 (2002). 
 194. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
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receipt of payment for the transfer of the player is a positive outcome, even 
if it is not optimal.  For the individual player, the transfer system is an 
excellent lever to increase financial outcomes.  In the absence of the 
transfer mechanism (and free agency), a player whose rights were initially 
acquired by a small market team would be subject to the budgetary 
restraints of that team for his entire career.  The transfer system almost 
surely guarantees that a player will be moving to the team that most highly 
values his services; often, this team will be larger and more highly 
monetized, with deeper pockets to pay its players. 
There is also an argument to be made that the transfer system is better 
for the transferor team (the team paying the transfer fee) as well.  If the 
transferor team is a large revenue club that is not particularly adept at 
developing its talent from within, and instead focuses its efforts on placing 
the highest quality team on the field at any given moment, then the 
transferor team may view the payment of the transfer fee as simply a cost 
of acquiring talent.  Although signing a player as a twelve-year old with 
potential is less expensive than signing a twenty-three-year old superstar, 
for a large revenue team without the skill to develop that twelve-year old, 
payment of the transfer fee may be the best option for fielding the best 
team. 
V.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT POSTING PROCESS 
A.  Worldwide Draft 
One alternative to the current posting process between NPB and MLB 
is to have a worldwide draft, an option that MLB is likely to pursue in the 
next collective bargaining negotiations with MLBPA, as the 2011 
expiration of the current agreement approaches.195  In both the NBA and 
NHL, an individual team is allowed to draft players from any country in the 
world, so long as those players meet the criteria of that league’s collective 
bargaining agreement (i.e., minimum age requirements in both leagues).196  
For MLB teams, however, the pool of players from which the teams can 
draft is confined to those players who are American citizens (or from 
American territories), Canadian citizens, or anyone who has attended either 
 
 195. Ronald Blum, MLB Likely to Defer Worldwide Draft Until ’12, HOUSTON CHRON., 
July 15, 2008, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/sports/5889555.html. 
 196. See discussion supra Part IV.  See also NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 
SEC. 8.4(a) (2005), http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf (requiring that players eligible 
for the draft be at least 18 years of age or older); NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT, ARTICLE X, SEC. 1, 
http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles/article-X.php (stipulating that the player must be at least 
19 years old and have met certain educational criteria related to high school or college). 
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high school or college in the United States.197  Because the MLB teams are 
not allowed to draft foreign players, the resulting framework is a collection 
of individual agreements with foreign federations regarding the way in 
which foreign players are transferred to MLB teams.  In most instances, 
MLB teams are free to sign players from foreign countries in a way that 
very closely approximates a free transfer system.  These transfers, though, 
are subject to the agreements that MLB has in place with the governing 
federations, as is the case with both Japan and Korea.198 
Because of the suboptimality of the current posting process for the 
transfer of players from NPB to MLB, there is room for improvement in 
this system.  A worldwide draft would change the economics of global 
talent acquisition, though it is unclear exactly how this would occur.199  
Proponents of a worldwide draft believe that it would decrease prices paid 
for high-quality international players and reduce signing bonuses by 
providing MLB teams with leverage, since the clubs would have exclusive 
negotiating rights with the player, rather than allowing the player to engage 
the clubs in a competitive bidding situation.200  Those opposed to a 
worldwide draft believe that it would increase player development costs by 
eliminating the possibility of signing a large number of players to low cost 
contracts and would disincentivize teams from scouting internationally, 
since the players they develop would be subject to selection by another 
team.201 
The reality is that both parties are correct to some degree.  Prices for 
high-end talent would likely fall due to the exclusive nature of the drafting 
rights, but the finite (and likely decreased) number of draft rounds would 
 
 197. MLB.com, First Year Player Draft:  Official Rules, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter First Year 
Player Draft]. 
 198. See Gould, supra note 15, at 290 (discussing the negotiated protocol between the 
U.S. and Japan). See also Barry M. Bloom, Tazawa Unlikely to Alter Asian Market, 
MLB.COM, Nov. 8, 2008, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20081105&content_id=3665291&vkey=hotstove
2008&fext=.jsp (explaining the Japanese and Korean federation player transfer agreements). 
 199. Bill King, Global Draft Building Army of Supporters, SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 3, 2000, 
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article/15318. 
 200. Id.  The 2008 MLB international signing bonus period from July 2-August 31, 2008 
resulted in five of the top ten all-time highest bonuses paid to international players, 
including the three most lucrative deals ever bestowed—the richest being a $4.25 million 
bonus given by the Oakland A’s to sixteen-year old Dominican pitcher Michael Inoa.  
Baseball Am., Prospects: International Affairs: Top 20 2008 International Signing Period 
Bonuses,  Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.baseballamerica.com/online/prospects/international-
affairs/2008/266917.html. 
 201. King, supra note 199.  One MLB team’s scouting director stated, “Right now, you 
can sign 10 players for $2,000 each and, with development, one or two might make it to the 
big leagues[.]  You make what by comparison are modest investments in scouting and 
development and it pays off.  I'm not sure I like a system that takes that away.”  Id. 
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still allow teams to mine baseball-rich countries for undrafted talent at a 
reasonable price.202  A worldwide draft would also eliminate a great deal of 
the malfeasance surrounding the signing bonuses paid to high-end 
international players.203  In fact, the FBI has been investigating whether 
scouts and team executives have skimmed money off the top of the bonuses 
paid to Latin American prospects.204 
A worldwide draft, or at least a United States and Japan draft, would 
partially alleviate the suboptimality of the current system by allowing MLB 
teams to assign a quasi-market value to Japanese players whose services 
were desired by MLB teams.  By drafting the rights to NPB players in a 
draft that includes American players as well, MLB teams would be able to 
assign a value to NPB players that approximated the players’ market value 
by drafting more valuable players in earlier rounds and less desirable 
players in later rounds. 
The movement of players between NPB and MLB would increase as a 
result of a worldwide draft because more players would move to MLB, or 
the MLB minor leagues, than under the current system.  By allowing more 
players to move from one league to another, the artificial premium 
currently paid for Japanese players under the posting process would be 
reduced as more and more NPB players moved across the Pacific.  MLB 
teams, instead of having to pay upwards of $50 million just for the chance 
to negotiate with a NPB player, would instead be able to draft that player, 
which would constitute a more efficient and lower-cost method of 
acquiring the rights.205  
A draft where all thirty MLB teams participate against one another to 
acquire the rights to the best talent allows clubs to understand the markets 
 
 202. For example, according to a high-ranking MLB executive who spoke with Professor 
Rosner on the condition of anonymity, twenty-nine of the thirty teams currently operate 
developmental baseball academies in the Dominican Republic.  Players can be signed to 
contracts at sixteen years of age, and each team has approximately thirty to thirty-five 
players in its academy at any one time.  The average player is in the academy for between 
two and three years, and approximately 10% of the academy players make it to the MLB 
club’s United States minor league system.  Interview with Anonymous MLB Executive 
(July 17, 2008) (notes on file with Professor Rosner).  Chris Kraul, Finding Diamonds in the 
Rough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at D3; Kat O’Brien, In Dominican Republic, Baseball is 
a Way Out, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.newsday.com/sports/in-dominican-
republic-baseball-is-a-way-out-1.895448. 
 203. Alan Schwarz, Pressure Building for Draft of Players From Outside U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2008, at Sports 4. 
 204. Id.  Mike Arbuckle, then the Philadelphia Phillies’ assistant general manager, 
stated, “The reality is, we’re finding that there have been dollars not going to players—guys 
who used to get $30,000 but are now getting reported bonuses of $350,000 are actually 
getting $75,000 and the rest is going to other places[.]  The whole business down there, the 
F.B.I. and baseball have decided to take a hard look at it.  And part of the response is, we 
eliminate a lot if we just put these guys into the draft.  This is a way of cleaning it up.”  Id. 
 205. Rockerbie, supra note 3. 
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for individual players more fully, because the system of drafting players is 
public and each team knows the relative values placed on players by the 
drafting teams.206 
There are, however, several significant hurdles to overcome before 
such a system could be implemented, as both the MLBPA and the NPB 
owners would have concerns that need to be addressed.  In exchange for 
 
 206. However, the potential danger of expanding the draft to include Japan and Korea, 
and continuing to exclude the rest of the world is a concern.  In 1989, MLB expanded its 
draft to include Puerto Rico. See Rafael Hermoso, Baseball and Books, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2003, at Sports 1 (discussing historical barriers to entry in major league baseball 
experienced by many Puerto Ricans).  Fifty-five Puerto Rican players were selected in the 
MLB Rule IV (entry) draft in 1989.  Id.  At the time, there were thirty-two Puerto Rican 
players in MLB and the island had a successful winter league.  Baseball-Almanac, Major 
League Baseball Players by Birthplace During the 1989 Season, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/players/birthplace.php?y=1989 (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).  In 2008, twenty-six 
Puerto Rican players were selected in the draft.  MLB.com, Highlights, Details of Major 
League Baseball's 2008 First-Year Player Draft announced, June 12, 2008, 
http://tampabay.rays.mlb.com/content/printer_friendly/mlb/y2008/m06/d12/c2900909.jsp.  
That same year, the number of Puerto Rican players in MLB dropped to twenty-nine and the 
winter league had to suspend operations after playing for sixty-nine consecutive years. Jesse 
Sanchez, Baseball Academy a Hit in Puerto Rico, MLB.COM, Nov. 29, 2008, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20081126&content_id=3693851&vkey=news_ml
b&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb&partnerId=rss_mlb.  Puerto Rican baseball officials attribute the 
demise of baseball on the island in part to its inclusion in the MLB draft.  Hermoso, supra 
note 206.  MLB clubs pay less attention to Puerto Rico and deploy fewer scouts to mine the 
island for hidden talent, as any player found cannot be signed; rather, the MLB team must 
draft the player.  Schwarz, supra note 203.  Since the MLB team has only a one in thirty 
chance of doing so, the odds that the team will reap the rewards of its scouting expertise are 
minimal.  Id.  Thus, the clubs focus their attention elsewhere—the other Caribbean nations 
and Latin America—where they are able to sign any discovered talent and fully capitalize 
on their scouting expertise.  Id. 
Since including players in a draft reduces the compensation that they receive, individuals 
residing in a country that is included in a worldwide draft are disincentivized financially 
from playing the sport.  This could lead to decreased participation in the sport in that 
country.  A goal of any sports league should be to increase participation in the sport, so 
including players in a draft could be counterproductive.  Nonetheless, the relative impact of 
including a country in a worldwide draft is decreased if the draft is truly global in nature; 
that is, every country in the world would be subject to the draft, without exception.  The 
scouting impact would be eliminated, as MLB teams would deploy scouts to the countries 
where they are most likely to find talented players.  Other caveats regarding the 
implementation of a worldwide draft involve the creation of a system that provides for the 
verifiable documentation of player ages to ensure they are indeed their stated age and the 
development of a training protocol for the two-year period of time between the ages of 16 
(when international players can currently be signed) and 18 (when they would be eligible for 
selection in a worldwide draft).  This is especially important because there is no organized 
high school baseball in many Latin American countries.  Gabrielle Paese, Baseball School 
Aims To Place More Puerto Rican Players In Major Leagues, P. R. HERALD, Dec. 13, 2002, 
http://www.puertorico-herald.org/issues/2002/vol6n50/PRSportsBeat0650-en.html. 
By way of contrast, baseball is played in Japanese high schools, similar to the United States.  
Jim Allen's Japanese Baseball Page, http://www2.gol.com/users/jallen/jimball.html (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2009). 
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subjecting a larger number of future union members to a draft system 
(where an MLB team acquires the rights to that player for at least six 
years), the MLBPA would likely want the number of rounds of the draft to 
be shortened significantly from its current maximum length of 50 rounds.  
This would allow the MLBPA to get more prospective players inked to 
contracts with teams that had demonstrated needs for that player, instead of 
the player being forced to sign with the team who drafted his rights; or, in 
the alternative, not sign with the drafting team and be eligible for the draft 
in the following year.207 
Even more significant are the concerns of the NPB team owners.  
Under the current posting process system, they are the constituency for 
whom the posting fee pays the greatest dividend; thus, the NPB owners are 
the group least likely to desire change from the status quo.  While the short-
term interests of NPB is arguably maximized when MLB teams pay posting 
fees for the rights to NPB players, an argument can be made that having 
NPB players eligible for the MLB Draft is in the long-term best interests of 
NPB.  That is, subjecting NPB players to a worldwide draft in which MLB 
teams could draft the rights to Japanese players would almost surely 
guarantee long-term survival for NPB—even if only as an unofficial minor 
league for MLB.  The focus of NPB, and many other professional leagues 
whose players would be subject to the MLB Draft, could shift to player 
development as a pseudo-minor league system.  While NPB owners may be 
reluctant to move to this type of model, it could be their best long-term 
option. 
Again, the leverage that MLB potentially has over NPB due to the 
Tazawa signing could provide NPB with the incentive necessary to change 
the system and accept a worldwide draft.  If Tazawa’s move has 
precedential impact on other young players and MLB teams, then MLB 
could have the leverage to negotiate the inclusion of Japanese players into a 
 
 207. First Year Player Draft, supra note 197.  There is evidence that the MLBPA and the 
MLB owners have considered such a worldwide draft proposal before, but because there 
was not enough time to consider the proposal fully, the sides decided to shelve the issue.  
See MLB-MLBPA BASIC AGREEMENT, 2003-2006, ATTACHMENT 24 (WORLD-WIDE DRAFT) 
202-03 (proposing a World-Wide Draft Subcommittee gather to take-up issues raised by the 
negotiated expansion).  In this attachment, the consideration was to expand the First-Year 
Player Draft to “all players who are first entering Major League or Minor League baseball, 
regardless of the player’s residence.”  Id.  The proposal and agreement to consider the issue 
further mentions that the First Year Player Draft would be shortened to “at least 20” rounds 
and “no more than 38,” a concession granted by management in order to draw more 
international players into the relevant player pool.  Id.   However, the joint committee hardly 
met in the face of MLB’s decreased interest in the idea and it was barely discussed in the 
subsequent collective bargaining negotiations.  Schwarz, supra note 203.  For smaller-
market clubs, who may not have the financial resources of their large market counterparts, 
having a worldwide draft could realistically increase the club’s ability to compete for 
international players. 
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worldwide draft.  The proposed trade off to this agreement could be an 
agreement by MLB not to sign other non-drafted Japanese amateurs and 
maintenance of the status quo vis-à-vis the posting agreement.  Absent this 
leverage, it is likely to be very difficult to convince NPB to accept 
inclusion in a worldwide draft, despite the aforementioned arguments. 
Undoubtedly, the long-term dilemma facing NPB is a difficult one:  
try to forestall the internationalization of the game and risk losing even 
more star players to MLB, or accept the globalization of the game as reality 
and preserve a meaningful role.  Though unlikely to occur, the greatest risk 
for NPB is the possibility that it could lose its relevance following the 
continued loss of major talent to MLB.  Unlike the Negro Leagues (which 
folded soon after integration led to most of the best black players moving to 
MLB), extinction is not as grave a risk for NPB because of the geographic 
boundaries separating the two leagues.  After integration of American 
baseball, often the Negro League and MLB teams were competing in the 
same cities for the same fans, at a moment when the talent of MLB teams 
was far superior.208  In the hypothetical situation of the best Japanese 
players moving en masse to MLB, NPB is protected by the Pacific Ocean.  
Although technological advancements allow Japanese fans to watch 
Japanese players who are playing in MLB, this does not mean that those 
same Japanese fans can see their favorite players in person.  If for no other 
reason than ensuring the continuation of the culturally important 
performance of live professional baseball in Japan, NPB will still have a 
niche. 
B.   Flat Fee Paid by MLB to NPB 
The presence of a strong Japanese professional baseball league is of 
great benefit to MLB.  Beyond serving as a pool of playing talent for MLB 
clubs, NPB keeps the sport of baseball culturally relevant and popular in 
Japan.  That which is good for baseball is good for MLB, especially in the 
ever-flattening global sports marketplace.  The fact that the sport is 
ingrained into Japanese culture clearly makes the selling of American 
baseball in Japan a much easier task than it is in countries where the game 
does not have a fervent fan base.  Just as the minor leagues serve a 
grassroots function for MLB within the United States, NPB allows fans to 
develop a passion for the sport and experience it in a way that is otherwise 
unavailable through the mere watching of televised games.  It is easier to 
sell MLB—the top professional baseball league in the world—to a country 
that already has a strong interest in the sport.  An NPB that is so weakened 
 
 208. Rodney Fort and Joel Maxcy, The Demise of African American Baseball Leagues: 
A Rival League Explanation, 2 J. SPORTS ECON. 35, 44-45 (2001). 
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by player defections to America that fan interest in NPB dissipates is self-
defeating for MLB, and the league must remain sensitive to this issue.  To 
this end, it would make sense for MLB to pay NPB an annual fee to allow 
its players to be selected in the MLB Rule 4 draft.  NPB could allocate this 
money amongst its teams however it wanted, with the desired result being 
that the teams reinvest the money back into player development budgets so 
as to maintain a high quality of play in the league.  The annual fee paid by 
MLB could take several forms.209  It could be a fixed amount, or based on 
the number and placement of the players selected in the MLB draft, or a 
combination of both.  It may be difficult to convince the Japanese teams of 
the merits of this system because the corporate operating structure makes 
the owners less likely to reinvest these funds into the teams themselves and 
much more likely to extract the proceeds from the teams.210 
C.   Per-Player Transfer Fee to be Negotiated by Individual Stakeholders 
A third way to address the suboptimality of the NPB-MLB posting 
process is to have the transferor and transferee teams negotiate directly 
with one another for the appropriate transfer fee, in a similar fashion to the 
current system in place in the NBA and UEFA.  This system would ideally 
be layered upon a worldwide draft, such that the transferor team in MLB 
would have already drafted the rights to the individual player (giving the 
MLB team exclusive negotiating rights vis-à-vis other MLB teams) and 
would then engage in direct, face-to-face negotiations with the player’s 
former team.  
Unlike the posting process, where there is no direct negotiation 
between NPB and MLB teams involved in the player transfer, this system 
would allow the two teams to bargain over terms of the transfer fee.  In 
strict financial terms, the benefactors of this proposed system would be 
MLB teams, because rather than overbidding for players as a result of the 
first-price-sealed-bid auction, an MLB team would only have to spend the 
precise value that an NPB team attached to the individual player in order to 
acquire the player’s rights.  In the example of Matsuzaka and the Red Sox, 
instead of offering a transfer fee that was $12 million more than the next 
highest bidder, the Red Sox would only have had to spend $1 more than the 
value which the Seibu Lions had attached to Matsuzaka.211  There is no 
definitive evidence to prove that $51.1 million, the price paid by the Red 
 
 209. The payment should be made directly from MLB’s Central Fund, so that each MLB 
team contributes an equal amount. 
 210. See discussion supra p. 29 (explaining that NPB teams are owned by large 
corporations usually more interested in maximizing short-term returns over long-term 
value). 
 211. Bloom, supra note 33. 
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Sox to negotiate with Matsuzaka, was the precise value assigned by Seibu 
to Matsuzaka.  In fact, many commentators, prior to the revelation that the 
Red Sox had bid $51.1 million to win the rights, had said the transfer fee 
would probably be between $20-30 million.212  There was little to no 
indication by any of the same commentators that a bid in the $20-30 
million range would have been unacceptable to the Seibu Lions; in fact, 
because Matsuzaka would have become a free agent after the 2008 season, 
the Lions wanted to ensure that they received some compensation for 
Matsuzaka and probably would have accepted a bid substantially lower 
than $51.1 million.  Had the Red Sox been able to directly negotiate with 
the Lions, after having drafted Matsuzaka’s rights, the dollar value of the 
transfer fee would have more accurately represented the two sides’ view of 
Matsuzaka’s value.  Instead of the Lions capturing the entire inefficiency of 
the posting process, the Red Sox could have reduced the inefficiencies 
within the transfer fee by bargaining directly with Seibu. 
 A potential concern regarding the implementation of the individually 
negotiated transfer fees is that the NPB team could dictate to which team 
the player is transferred by refusing to negotiate with certain MLB teams or 
declaring his price prospectively.213  For example, an NPB team seeking to 
prevent its star pitcher from going anywhere but the Red Sox or Mets could 
effectively put information into the marketplace that teams other than the 
Red Sox or Mets should abstain from drafting the rights to the pitcher, 
because the only two teams with which the NPB team would negotiate are 
the Red Sox or Mets.  From an economic standpoint, it is in the best 
interest of individual NPB teams, and the Japanese leagues as a whole, to 
have NPB players drafted exclusively by MLB teams with high payrolls.  
NPB and its teams likely would receive higher transfer fees from large-
revenue teams like the Red Sox, Mets, and Yankees than from small-
revenue clubs like the Tampa Bay Rays, Florida Marlins, Pittsburgh 
Pirates, or Kansas City Royals.214  This unilateral power of NPB teams to 
 
 212. Sackman, supra note 36; McAdam, supra note 54. 
 213. This tactic has been seen in the MLB Amateur Draft, whereby individual players 
sometimes disseminate information into the marketplace regarding their “signability”—
namely, the amount it will take to sign the player.  This raises competitive balance concerns 
because, traditionally, there has been a correlation between overall payroll and team 
performance.  If the lower payroll teams draft first (as a result of the reverse order of final 
standing draft model used by MLB), and the best players are refusing to sign unless it is 
with a team that can meet their contract demands, this could lead to a situation where the 
best teams get the best new talent based solely on the fact that the best talent make contract 
demands that only the best teams can afford.  This perverse result could have a direct impact 
on competitive balance within the league. 
 214. See Salaries Database, USA TODAY, 
http://asp.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/salaries/totalpayroll.aspx?year=2007 (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2009)(highlighting the multi-million dollar payroll gap between large- and small- 
revenue MLB teams). 
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dictate the teams to which their players are transferred could seriously 
undermine the efficacy of the draft and individually negotiated transfer fees 
to promote an efficient marketplace for the exchange of player services. 
 Should the individual NPB team be able to effectively control where 
its players can be transferred, the NPB team may become unnecessarily 
powerful and there will be greater implications on competitive balance in 
the MLB.  Smaller revenue MLB clubs, like the aforementioned Rays, 
Marlins, Pirates, or Royals will not benefit from the talents of NPB players 
in the same way that the larger revenue clubs could.  The existence of the 
worldwide draft would be far more equitable in the distribution of talent 
across MLB teams, but this equity could be eviscerated if NPB teams (who 
have a direct financial incentive) strong arm negotiations so that only the 
large revenue teams have a realistic chance to sign NPB players. 
D.   Per Player Transfer Fee; Uniform 
A fourth alternative to the current posting system is to have a transfer 
agreement that mandates a fixed, per-player transfer fee that is paid each 
time a player under contract with the NPB team is signed by an MLB club.  
A variation of this model was used by the NHL in its most recent Player 
Transfer Agreement with the European hockey federations (minus 
Russia)—for each player under contract that was signed by an NHL club, 
the transferee team received $200,000.215 
 Whether or not this system contributed to the prevalence of 
international players in the NHL is uncertain, but one thing the uniform 
transfer fee certainly did was reduce the transaction costs of player 
movement to the NHL.  Because all three parties knew that $200,000 was 
the amount the transferee team would receive each time one of their players 
under contract signed a deal with an NHL club, there was no negotiating 
that needed to take place.  This uniform transfer fee was not the most 
desirable option for the transferee team; however, it was preferable to the 
current system where there is the possibility of the transferee team 
receiving no compensation for the loss of its star players.216 
The NHL team and transferred player both directly benefitted in 
instances where the $200,000 fee represented less than market value for the 
transfer of the player.  This was typically in instances where the player 
being transferred was an international star, or where the player 
demonstrated the potential to be an NHL star.  It was also these instances 
 
 215. Canadian Press, supra note 145. 
 216. This is currently the situation with Russian hockey teams, where the Russian Ice 
Hockey Federation has thus far refused to sign the current deal.  See discussion supra pp. 
50-55 (discussing the state of player transfer agreements, including with the Russian 
Federation). 
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where the transfer is suboptimal for the transferee team.  The NHL team, 
however, captured the inefficiencies of this transaction because it did not 
have to pay the “true” transfer value of the player and could instead acquire 
the rights to the player for less than what they would have had to pay in an 
open marketplace.217  If this system were applied to the NPB-MLB 
relationship, MLB teams would prefer the uniform transfer fee arrangement 
to both the current posting process and the individually negotiated transfer 
fee systems, because the uniform transfer fee system, like that used in the 
NHL, best allows the transferor team to protect its financial interests. 
The individual players being transferred also prefer the uniform 
transfer fee to both the posting process and the individually negotiated 
transfer fee because it allows the player to capture more of his market value 
once the player and the transferor team begin contract negotiations.  The 
value a team places on a player will be measured by the total amount of 
money that the team is willing to spend on the acquisition of the player 
(both transfer fee and eventual player contract), and if a team spends less 
than market value on the transfer fee, it follows that the team then has more 
money to spend on the eventual player contract.  Matsuzaka was valued by 
the Red Sox at $103.1 million, and if the Red Sox paid less than $51.1 
million on the transfer fee, there would have been more than $52 million 
left to negotiate an actual contract with the player.218  While Matsuzaka 
probably would not have captured his full $103.1 million value under the 
uniform player transfer fee, it is reasonable to surmise that the contract the 
pitcher ultimately received would have represented more than the fifty 
percent of the pitcher’s overall value that he received under the existing 
system. 
The clear loser under this framework is the transferee team.  Teams 
will not sign players whose value is less than the uniform transfer fee, and 
will instead focus on players whose value is significantly greater than the 
predetermined transfer fee amount.  While there would undoubtedly be an 
increase in the overall number of transfers from NPB teams to MLB teams, 
the overall value of the transfer fees would not approximate the value under 
the current system.  Assuming that the NHL transfer fee of $200,000 per 
player is adopted, it would take 250 player transfers for the Seibu Lions to 
get the same amount as they did under the Matsuzaka transfer! 
In order for a uniform player transfer fee to be effective, the system 
must be implemented by all of the countries from which foreign players are 
 
 217. Logically, the NHL team more often than not captures these inefficiencies—at the 
expense of the transferee team—because if an NHL team determines that a player’s transfer 
value is less than the uniform $200K fee, the NHL team would not only abstain from paying 
the fee, the team would also probably abstain from drafting the player in the first place. 
 218. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing Matsuzaka’s share of the $103.1 
million the Red Sox paid in transfer and contract fees). 
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drawn.  This has been a major issue faced by the IIHF and encountered in 
the implementation of the International Player Transfer Agreement.  
Because the Russian Federation was not party to the Agreement, the 
signing of players under contract with a Russian club by an NHL team did 
not require the payment of a transfer fee.219  The major stumbling block 
preventing the signing of the agreement by the Russians was that the 
compensation for their star players like Alex Ovechkin and Evgeni Malkin 
fell woefully short of the players’ actual value. 
E.   Per Player Transfer Fee; Uniform with Classes of Players 
A fifth alternative to the posting process is to utilize the uniform per 
player transfer fee, but have several different levels of transfer fees based 
upon the varying degrees of a player’s performance and skill set.  Teams 
transferring star players would receive significantly more in transfer fees 
than would teams losing older, marginal players.  Likewise, the transferor 
teams would have to pay premiums for star players, which is precisely what 
would happen in the open marketplace.  Although this system is not 
optimal for the players being transferred, it does represent a middle point 
on the continuum between strictly uniform transfer fees and the current 
posting process. 
Formation of this system would require input from both the NPB and 
MLB on the classification of a player, particularly if the amount of the 
transfer fee were dependent upon a classification of the individual player’s 
skill level.  First, a classification scheme would have to be created, with 
varying compensation figures attaching to the different types of players.  
For example, a star right-handed pitcher like Matsuzaka would have a 
higher transfer fee than an older utility infielder.  Determining a player’s 
classification, however, is where the creation of this system becomes most 
difficult.  Therefore, it would be necessary to have an independent third-
party, selected using criteria agreed upon by both NPB and MLB, as the 
final decision-maker on disagreements of player classification.220  
Particularly with regards to determining the differences between star and 
superstar players, these classifications could have significant financial 
impacts. 
This proposed system addresses the concerns an NPB team would 
have regarding the uniform player transfer fee; namely, that the team is not 
being compensated fairly for the loss of its best players.  With regards to 
the IIHF-NHL Transfer Agreement, lack of fair compensation for star 
 
 219. Canadian Press, supra note 145. 
 220. Such a system already exists in MLB, with Elias Sports Bureau ranking the players 
into different categories (Types A and B) in order to determine the compensation owed to 
the player’s former team should he sign with a new club via free agency. 
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players was the precise reason given by the Russian Federation for not 
being party to the agreement.221  While these levels of player transfer fees 
will be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, this system would yield a 
more efficient transfer fee than would a uniform system.  At the same time, 
the individual player’s ability to capture his true market value would again 
suffer as a result of the transferor team being forced to pay a sizeable 
portion of the player’s value to someone other than the player himself. 
F.   Percentage System 
Another proposal for reform of the current NPB-MLB transfer system 
is to have the transfer fee amount determined as a percentage of the 
ultimate contract signed by the player with the MLB team.  Under this 
system, the NPB team would again only receive compensation if the player 
signed a contract with the MLB team, and that compensation would be 
subject to the market forces of direct contract negotiation.  Unlike the 
current system, where only one team may negotiate with the NPB player, 
this system would allow for direct solicitation of the player’s services by 
any and all teams that desired him.  The percentage payment to the NPB 
team would be in addition to, and not subtracted from, the final contract 
amount received by the player.  The cost of signing the player, then, is the 
value of the contract plus the percentage-based transfer fee. 
This proposed system is the most optimal for the player, and 
represents a far superior outcome than is achieved in the current posting 
process.  Rather than have situations where MLB teams are calculating 
player values using dollar amounts paid to the NPB team and not the 
player, the player in this system would receive very near his market value.  
This is especially true if more than one team is permitted to negotiate with 
the player.  But there is still the possibility that the ultimate contract 
received does not represent the player’s true market value if teams 
incorporate the percentage fee into the amount it is willing to pay the 
player.  Despite this possibility, this system does not impact the total 
amount of the compensation received by the player nearly as much as the 
current posting system, especially if the new system allows for multiple 
suitors to pursue each player. 
NPB owners may not prefer this proposed system to the one currently 
in place, but there are structural factors built into the proposal that ensure 
that NPB teams are fairly compensated for the caliber of players lost.  
Because the payment to the NPB team is a function of the total value of the 
contract given to the player by the MLB team, it follows that the NPB team 
will receive more money when it loses a star player compared to a role 
 
 221. Fyodorov, supra note 152. 
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player.  While a percentage-based payment would probably not yield the 
same possibilities of the current system’s payment, from the NPB’s 
perspective, the percentage system ensures that the loss of the best players 
yields the highest transfer payments. 
Whether or not MLB teams would prefer a percentage-based payment 
model depends entirely on the percentage payment established.  Should the 
percentage rise above twenty-five percent, it is conceivable that MLB 
teams would prefer, or at least be impartial to, the current system.  The 
preferred aspect of this proposed system, from the perspective of MLB 
teams, is that individual teams can negotiate with the player directly, 
without the sealed bidding of the current auction.  This transparency will 
prevent the type of overbidding evidenced by the Red Sox’s $12 million 
overpayment for Matsuzaka’s services.  This system, however, still has 
limitations.  NPB teams could hijack the transfer of players, and skew 
MLB’s competitive balance, by only negotiating with deep-pocketed 
teams.  This system may lead to competitive balance issues if small market 
teams are entirely excluded from this labor pool.  Further, the more 
efficient transfers that would result from applying a percentage-based 
system would favor Japanese players attempting to transfer and MLB 
teams, defeating NPB’s intent to prevent an exodus of talent from NPB to 
MLB. 
VI.  HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 
This is not the first instance of a player transfer system being critical 
to determining the relationship between MLB and another league.  After 
Jackie Robinson integrated MLB in 1947, the relationship between MLB 
and the Negro Leagues was forever changed by the influx of African-
American players into MLB.222  Had a more comprehensive and effective 
transfer system been in place, it is possible that the Negro Leagues would 
not have vanished as a viable economic entity.  There is undoubtedly an 
irreversible trend of NPB players coming across the Pacific to the riches of 
MLB.  If the trend continues, the Japanese league risks becoming a league 
bereft of its star players. 
A formal relationship never existed, pre-integration, between MLB 
and the Negro Leagues.  This lack of protocol was one of the main reasons 
the Negro Leagues diminished in popularity and ultimately folded in 1957, 
ten years after Jackie Robinson’s historic feat.223  There was no posting 
process and no system of payment for the transfer of players.  Negotiations 
were typically between the Negro League player and the MLB team.  In 
 
 222. NEIL LANCTOT, NEGRO LEAGUE BASEBALL: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A BLACK 
INSTITUTION 386 (2004). 
 223. Id. 
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many cases, the Negro League club with whom the player was under 
contract was omitted from the conversation entirely.224  This situation was 
particularly true during the earliest player signings.  As was typically the 
case in the Negro Leagues at the time, Jackie Robinson was reportedly 
operating under an oral agreement with his Negro League club, the Kansas 
City Monarchs.225  The contract that he signed to play for the Brooklyn 
Dodgers’ top minor league affiliate in Montreal in 1946 provided him with 
a salary of $600 per month and a $3,500 signing bonus, but more 
importantly it contained a clause stating that he was free of any obligation 
to any other club with no compensation owed from the Dodgers.226  While 
the white owners of the Kansas City Monarchs alleged that the club had a 
written contract with Robinson and threatened both to protest to MLB 
Commissioner Albert ‘Happy’ Chandler and to file a lawsuit against the 
Dodgers, they backed down from these threats amidst public pressure from 
the African-American community and media desiring integration, and 
agreed to allow Robinson to play for the organization.227  Nonetheless, they 
publicly stated that they felt that Dodgers owed them compensation.228 
Though no litigation was ever commenced, these complaints were 
subsequently echoed by other Negro League owners, who argued to 
Commissioner Chandler that MLB teams should negotiate with Negro 
League clubs directly rather than with the players, explaining “that while 
they were ‘glad to see [their] players get the opportunity to play in white 
baseball, [they were] simply protesting the way it was done.’”229  The 
Negro Leagues’ commissioners requested the leagues be formally 
recognized by MLB as either minor or major leagues, which would have 
allowed them to participate in the compensation scheme that had been 
established between MLB and its affiliated minor leagues.230  MLB 
Commissioner Chandler met these complaints with derision.231  Though no 
formal player transfer agreement or protocol was ever reached between the 
leagues, subsequent signings of Negro League players by MLB teams were 
negotiated between the respective clubs rather than between the player and 
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the MLB team.232  Negro League owners hoped to realize significant 
revenues by selling players to MLB, but this never came to fruition because 
the Negro Leagues were unable to respond adequately to the MLB teams 
raiding their teams’ rosters by doing so in kind, and they had no other 
outlet with which to align themselves.233  Thus, MLB teams rarely paid a 
fair market transfer fee, in large part because the Negro League clubs felt 
that they lacked the leverage to negotiate.234  After the owner of his Negro 
League team was rebuffed in an attempt to sell his rights to the New York 
Yankees for $100,000, Larry Doby became the first African-American to 
play in the American League in 1947.235  MLB’s Cleveland Indians 
purchased his rights from his Negro League team for $10,000 plus an 
additional $5,000 bonus, payable if he was able to complete thirty days on 
Cleveland’s roster.236   The rights to Satchel Paige were sold by the Kansas 
City Monarchs to the Cleveland Indians in 1948 for a mere $5,000.237 
Nonetheless, these small transfer fees238 became a needed source of 
revenue for the Negro League clubs, and the exodus of players to MLB 
clubs accelerated in 1948.239  This caused a decrease in the quality of play 
in the Negro Leagues240 and fans stopped coming to the ballparks and 
supporting their favorite Negro League teams as a result.241  Negro Leagues 
attendance dropped precipitously from 1946 (the last season pre-
integration) to 1948; for example, the Newark Eagles’ home attendance 
declined seventy-one percent.242  By 1949, there were thirty-six former 
Negro Leaguers in MLB and their former league was well into its 
demise.243  When taken in combination with the desire of African-American 
baseball fans to support an interracial business that more closely reflected 
their goal of an integrated society, the poor organizational structure of the 
Negro Leagues, and the typically poor team management, the Negro 
Leagues finally had too many obstacles to overcome.244  The Negro 
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National League folded after the 1948 season, with two of its clubs 
disbanding and a third focusing on barnstorming.245  While the Negro 
American League reconstituted itself and continued to plod along, a lack of 
interest, combined with other obstacles, undermined the viability of the 
league as a whole.  The Negro American League struggled until the last 
Negro League game was played in 1957.246  Ultimately, while there is no 
doubt that society as a whole benefited from the integration of the major 
leagues, integration was not without its costs to the Negro League fans, 
owners, and former players who did not make it to MLB.247 
The current MLB-NPB system presents many of the same issues, 
particularly with regards to player movement and the impact that 
movement has on the health of the individual leagues.  There is a 
compelling argument that it is in the best interests of MLB to preserve the 
long-term health of NPB, unlike what happened with the Negro Leagues, 
because NPB (and not MLB) is the best cultivator of Japanese talent.  The 
owners of NPB teams have an interest in preserving the health of their 
league, while MLB owners have a similar interest in their own league.  Any 
player transfer agreement would seemingly have to address both of these 
competing desires, although the place on the spectrum between where the 
self-preservation ends and the actual agreement falls will be the product of 
negotiation. 
 As previously noted, one critical difference between the 
circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the Negro Leagues and the 
current state of NPB is the geographic proximity of the competitor league.  
During the late 1940s, after MLB had been integrated, many Negro League 
teams competed in the same cities as their MLB counterparts.  In an era 
when gate receipts were the primary source of team revenue, the fact that 
many fans went to the higher quality MLB games had a direct effect on the 
lack of monetization for the Negro Leagues. 
In the current situation, however, it cannot be said that fans are 
choosing to attend MLB games instead of NPB games.  A more accurate 
characterization may be that NPB fans are now following former NPB 
players who have signed with MLB teams (at the expense of following an 
NPB team) through digital media.  But to what extent the following of 
MLB via digital media will erode a revenue stream (gate receipts) for NPB 
is uncertain.  Another difference in the current situation is cultural.  
Baseball has long been a very important part of the fabric of Japanese 
culture and it remains the national pastime.  There is simply too much pride 
in Japanese baseball to allow the long-standing, deep-pocketed professional 
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league to fail.  Despite the conceptual similarities, there are substantial 
differences between the Negro Leagues and NPB that are likely to lead to a 
different end result and allow NPB to survive notwithstanding the 
suboptimality of the player transfer agreement. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In the ever-flattening world, the challenge for MLB and NPB is to 
create a transfer system that is more efficient than the current model, while 
at the same time preserving NPB’s status as a viable economic entity.  It is 
imperative for the sport of baseball that NPB remain intact; the demise of 
the second-strongest professional baseball league in the world would have 
a deleterious effect on the global growth of the sport and, ultimately, on 
MLB.  The triumvirate of key stakeholders must all agree to effectuate any 
of the proposed alternatives, and there is an implicit tension between the 
desires of NPB, MLB, and MLBPA.  Two alternatives stand out from the 
others.  The first is a global draft layered upon a NBA/UEFA-esque system 
of team-to-team negotiation.  The second is a percentage-based system, 
where the transfer fee paid to the NPB team is determined as a percentage 
of the ultimate contract signed by the player with the MLB team.  It is left 
to the stakeholders to determine the system that best fits their needs. 
 
 
 
